A study of the terrain at the Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862

 Hi gang,

It was ten years ago this month, that I completed my master's thesis on the influence of terrain at the Battle of Antietam.

This was essentially my final act at Antietam, as I had been informed by the superintendent at that time, that upon completion of my degree I would be let go from Antietam to find work elsewhere.  So it was bittersweet to get both my degree and the sack at the same time.

Now, I'm happily retired and have moved on to more satisfying things, nonetheless, here, for those who are interested, is the fruit of my labor, as well as my swan-song at Antietam., submitted for your consideration (or not).

Best wishes for a happy 2025.

Mannie

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AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

 

Charles Town, West Virginia

 

 

 

 

A TERRAIN STUDY OF THE 1862 MARYLAND CAMPAIGN

AND THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

 

 

 

 

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

 

Requirements for the degree of

 

MASTER OF ARTS

 

in

 

MILITARY HISTORY

 

By

 

Manuel A. Gentile

 

 

Department Approval Date:

January 26, 2014

                                                              

The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these contents for educational purposes.

 

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author’s creation or in the public domain.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I wish to gratefully acknowledge the efforts of my fellow rangers at Antietam National Battlefield in helping shape my thinking for this project.  The endless hours we have spent together hiking and discussing the terrain of the battlefields of the Maryland Campaign were an essential component of my research.  I also wish to thank the Chief Historian of Antietam National Battlefield, Ted Alexander, for his invaluable insights and for providing me with full access to the archives of Antietam National Battlefield.

         

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

 

A TERRAIN STUDY OF THE 1862 MARYLAND CAMPAIGN

AND THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

by

Manuel A. Gentile

 

American Public University System, January 26, 2014

 

Charles Town, West Virginia

 

Professor John Chappo, Thesis Professor

 

            What follows is a study of the influence of terrain on the Maryland Campaign of 1862 which was comprised of four battles: South Mountain, Harpers Ferry, Antietam, and Boetler’s Ford or Shepherdstown.  The study intends to fill a gap in the existing literature by examining the influence of terrain on the campaign with special emphasis on the terrain features of the September, 1862 Battle of Antietam.  The author of this thesis acknowledges that terrain is a determining factor of all battles and that the battles of the Maryland Campaign are not unique in this aspect.  It is, rather, the focus of this paper to examine the influence of terrain on the flow of the four battles of the Maryland Campaign as well as how that terrain informed command decisions.  No such study of the Maryland Campaign has yet been undertaken and it is the goal of this thesis to produce a document that will be useful to scholars of the Maryland Campaign.  The thesis provides and examination of the historiography of the Maryland Campaign with a particular focus on the Battle of Antietam exploring how often terrain, more than generalship, determined the flow of battle.  The study is told in a narrative format with the four battles examined in the sequence in which they occurred.  Further, the Cumberland Valley itself is included in this study as this campaign was the first time in which Robert E. Lee campaigned in mountainous territory and the terrain certainly influenced his movements and strategy.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

CHAPTER                                                                                                                                   PAGE

 

I.         LEE’S 1862 MARYLAND CAMPAIGN: THE TERRAIN OF INVASION………….14

II.         THE TERRAIN OF ANTIETAM; THE BATTLE NORTH OF SHARPSBURG……………31

 

III.        THE TERRAIN OF ANTIETAM: THE BATTLE SOUTH OF SHARPSBURG…………….53

 

Postscript………………………………………………………………………………………………...77

 

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………….82

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………………………………...……………………….84

 

Attachments A,B,C.D.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                  Introduction

 

If you take a flat map

And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,

The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.

The science of war is moving live men like blocks.

And getting blocks into place at a fixed moment.

But it takes time to mold your men into blocks.

And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies

Hamper your wooden squares.  They stick in the brush,

They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries,

And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them…

It is all so clear on the maps, so clear in the mind.

                                                                     Stephen Vincent Benet

                                                            John Brown’s Body[1]

 

          One can only imagine the disappointment felt by General Robert E. Lee on September 16^th 1862, as he observed the growing numbers of the Army of the Potomac which faced him from across Antietam Creek: an enemy army which outnumbered him nearly two to one and to whom he would be forced to give battle on the following day.  Lee’s Maryland campaign which held out such promise only a week earlier had since turned into a scramble to reunite his scattered army and find advantageous position as Lee went from an offensive operation to a desperate defensive posture in and around Sharpsburg, Maryland.  Lee’s sole advantage, other than the experience of his veteran troops, was the terrain upon which he chose to make his stand.  It was that terrain, often more than generalship, which would shape the course of the coming battle and cause opposing commanders to make often ill-informed decisions based upon what the deceptive landscape allowed them to see or not to see.

            The area comprising the Antietam battlefield lies between two dominant topographical features: South Mountain and the Potomac River.  The terrain between these features is significantly compressed resulting in an area with pronounced and numerous rock outcroppings, ridges, ravines, and undulations of the landform.   Terrain significantly influences the flow and outcome of all battles as well as command decision making at all levels.   It will be the purpose of this thesis to identify the most significant terrain features of the Antietam battlefield, and to a lesser degree, the terrain of the Maryland Campaign and interpret the influence of that terrain on the campaign and resulting battle. This study will also attempt to demonstrate how the terrain influenced the decision making of commanders from army to regimental level.  As with generals in any battle, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and Gen. Robert E. Lee as well as their subordinates, conducted the battle based upon the challenges of the terrain.  This study will focus on Antietam and as the literature provides no existing comprehensive examination of the terrain vis-à-vis the battle intends to fill a gap in the literature.  Numerous resources exist which mention or allude to the various terrain aspects of the field at Antietam and how they impacted the battle, but nowhere is there an account that synthesizes all of these materials to provide a comprehensive terrain study of the battle.  It is the primary aim of this thesis to provide that study and to add to the existing literature and provide a terrain study of the Antietam Battlefield, which can be of use to scholars and historians alike. 

          Although there is nothing in the literature which provides a comprehensive terrain study of the Battle of Antietam, there are numerous primary sources which specifically mention or allude to the effect of discrete terrain features on the movement of troops and the influence of that terrain upon the decision making of unit commanders.  Most notable among these sources are the Official Record of the War of the Rebellion (OR), the manuscript of Battlefield Board commissioner Ezra Carman, and the 1904 survey maps of Emmor Cope.  Noteworthy is the fact that all of the above sources were by men who participated in the battle.  

          The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion (OR) contains nearly three hundred reports on the battle by commanders of all levels both Union and Confederate.  The majority of the reports contain references to specific terrain features though it is incumbent upon the reader to discern how these features affected the dynamic of the overall struggle as the individual unit accounts generally provide an accounting of that unit viewed in isolation from all others.  Within the reports published in the OR many illustrative references are made to the effect of specific terrain features on the fortunes, or misfortunes, of the units in question. [2]

          Also contained in the OR, though a stand-alone primary source in its own right, are the proceedings of the Military Commission of the Court of Inquiry examining the Federal loss at Harpers Ferry.  The document is exhaustive in the testimony collected and the witnesses called.  The proceedings emphasize the importance of key terrain features during the investiture of Harpers Ferry by the Confederates and establishes culpability for the loss of that strategically important town.

            Of singular importance to this thesis is the seminal work by battle participant Ezra Carman.  In 1862 Carman was Colonel of the 13^th New Jersey Volunteer Infantry and was part of the XII Corps participating in the Battle of Antietam.  In 1894 Carman was charged by the original Battlefield Board with the responsibility of determining the boundaries of the park and writing a narrative of the battle. It is that narrative that provides the foundation of the manner by which Antietam National Battlefield interprets the battle to this day.[3]

           To create the narrative of the battle Carman compiled nearly 3,000 pieces of correspondence from battle participants describing the positions and action of their units during the battle.  Carman used these veteran’s letters, in conjunction with the OR, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (B&L), and the Century Magazine series on the Civil War, to create a detailed narrative of the flow of battle.[4] Although Carman did not produce a terrain study, his work does provide much information on the influence of terrain on the flow of the fighting and the decision making of unit commanders.  Carman makes mention of several important terrain features of the field at Antietam including Nicodemus Heights, the Dunker Church plateau,  and the Mumma swale along with others which this paper will add to and expand upon.

          Another especially valuable asset to any analysis of the battle are the maps of Emmor Cope.  Cope was a sergeant in the Topographical engineers during the Civil War, and like Carman, Cope was charged by the Battlefield Board with producing a series of maps as a crucial component of the battle narrative.  When used in conjunction the maps of Cope and the narrative of Carman provide a clear picture of the movement of individual regiments over the course of the battle.  Cope’s fourteen maps divide the fighting into increments of time and provide graphic illustration of the movement of troops upon the field.  Cope’s maps are topographic and indicate specific terrain features including ravines, woodlots, creeks, rock outcroppings, swales, and ridgelines as well as man-made features including fences, rock fences, rock walls, stack yards and buildings.

          Other worthy primary sources include books and letters written by battle participants including James Longstreet, Jacob Cox, Francis W. Palfrey and others, both Union and Confederate.  The works of Palfrey and Cox are particularly instructive.  Palfrey, a regimental commander in the Union II corps, provides an account of events on the Union right, focusing especially on the fighting in the Cornfield and the climactic struggle in the West Woods in which Palfrey was wounded and the II corps was shattered.[5] Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, in command of the IX corps (under the direction of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside) provides a detailed narrative of events on the Union left.  His memoir is instructive as it demonstrates that the final phase of the battle, often thought to center on the taking of the Lower (Burnside) Bridge, was actually played out in the final Union attack upon Sharpsburg culminating with the arrival of Confederate General A.P. Hill on the field at exactly the right moment to save Lee from utter destruction.[6]  For an account of the action at the Union center is the book published in 1864 by George B. McClellan in which he recounts the battle.  Although the work by McClellan is as self-serving as one might expect from a candidate for the presidency, it does provide insights into the situation in McClellan’s center and the circumstances and terrain considerations that informed his thinking at crucial points during the battle.[7]

          Significant among Confederate accounts of the battle is Maj. Gen. James Longstreet’s From Manassas to Appomattox: memoirs of the Civil War in America.   Longstreet commanded the right of Lee’s line from the Sunken Road, through Sharpsburg, to Lower Bridge, and he provides a clear narrative of the events and the terrain encompassed by his position.  Additionally, as one of Lee’s two corps commanders on the field, Longstreet provides a fairly comprehensive accounting of the entire line – left, right, and center.[8]

          Robert E. Lee’s chief of ordnance during the Maryland Campaign, Edward Porter Alexander, provides one of the few accounts to be found in the literature that is critical of Lee.  Alexander provides a counter to much of the “Lost Cause” canonization of Lee with a narrative which calls into question Lee’s use of terrain at Aniteam.  Alexander is especially critical of Lee’s decision to make a stand with the broad Potomac River at his back.[9]

          Among the wealth of secondary sources four loom large: Steven Sears Landscape Turned Red[10], James Murfin’s The Gleam of Bayonets[11], a very recent work – Bradley Gottfried’s Maps of Antietam,[12] and the master narrative of the Maryland Campaign written by Joseph Harsh Taken at the Flood.[13]  Of the four of these it is the work of Harsh, coupled with the maps of Gottfried, which provides, the most objective battle narrative.   Not to be overlooked is the book by James McPherson; Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom.  Although McPherson dedicates only one chapter to the actual battle he does place the event into a historical and geographical context that was helpful to this study.[14]

          Gottfried’s atlas is more than merely a rehash of Carman and Cope.  His maps are broken down into shorter increments of time and concentrate on specific areas of the fight rather than using an overall base map as did Cope; in this manner Gottfried is able to provide more detail than does Cope.  Similarly Gottfried synthesizes the Carman narrative into a prose style that is somewhat more accessible to the reader than that of Carman.[15]

           All four of the above mentioned secondary works make many references to the terrain of the field although terrain and its influence is certainly not the focus of any of them.  Only when used in conjunction with each other and the work of Carman, Cope, and other primary sources, as well as observations of the field as it exists today, can a comprehensive analysis of the role of terrain on the battle come into view.  Such observations of the field will be an important component of this thesis as the Antietam battlefield remains little changed from its 1862 appearance.

          Noteworthy also among secondary sources is John D. Fuller’s Battlefield Terrain Study: Burnside’s Attack against the Confederate Right at Antietam.  Although the only terrain study per se on the battle, Fuller deals solely with the final phase of the battle and across a limited area.  Conspicuously absent in his bibliography are Carman and Palfrey.  Although he does use portions of the Cope maps he does so without attribution.  Fuller leaves room for a more comprehensive if not a more scholarly treatment of the subject.[16]  The findings of the research indicate that frequently fortuitous terrain worked to the benefit of troop movement independent of leadership.  Luck and terrain often controlled and determined the movement of troops more than did the conscious decision making of a unit commander.  The existing historiography of the subject does not specifically focus on the terrain of the battle but does provide many references to the terrain.  The aim of this study will be to bring together existing materials to provide a clear picture of the influence of the terrain upon the campaign and especially of the battle of Antietam and to examine how the knowledge, or lack of knowledge of that terrain informed the decision making of the opposing generals.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                  Chapter I 

                         Lee’s 1862 Maryland Campaign: The Terrain of Invasion

       Visitors to Antietam National Battlefield today consult the map in their park brochure both to orient themselves and to gain a rudimentary understanding of the battle.  Maps are comfortable in that they are visually pleasing to the eye and they bring a clarity to perception.  In this they are deceptive – turning the complex and confusing landscape into an overly simplified and easy to understand graphic representation where north is always pointing up and a scale of miles will always provide distances.  Park rangers frequently hold up the map to the view of visitors and say with some drama “this is not the battlefield” and then gesture to the field before them and say “This is the battlefield.”  The difference becomes immediately apparent to the visitor; the landscape before them is three-dimensional, filled with the creeks and gullies of which Stephen Vincent Benet writes.  The landscape is one of undulations, woodlots, ravines, deep creek valleys with high banks, and sheltering rock outcroppings. The battlefield, with all of its complex topography when shrouded in smoke and fog becomes a deadly and confusing landscape and that landscape of Antietam – the terrain of battle – had enormous impact upon the flow of the battle and may have determined the outcome of that battle even more than did generalship.  Surely command decisions at all levels, from army to regimental, were influenced and informed by the terrain and how it impacted what men could see, understand, and react to during thirteen desperate hours on that late summer day of September 17, 1862.

          To understand the Battle of Antietam it is necessary to place the battle within the context of both the military and political currents of the time and to analyze the terrain of the battlefield it is important to place it within the larger geographic framework of the region, and then from that viewpoint ratchet the focus inward to the battlefield itself. The Antietam Creek valley lies at the floor of what is known as the “Great Valley” of the Blue Ridge Mountains.  The Great Valley is bordered on the east by South Mountain and on the west by North Mountain.  The valley is oriented from the southwest to the northeast.  In Maryland the Great Valley is known as the Cumberland Valley which extends northward into Pennsylvania. Travelling south, when the Great Valley crosses the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia it changes its name to the Shenandoah Valley, though it is all one continuous valley [attachment A].

          The open terrain of the valley served as a perfect avenue of invasion for the Confederates, as it not only flanks Washington DC but empties out far to the north within striking distance of major Northern communication and population centers, Harrisburg and Philadelphia among them.  If an invading Rebel army were to block the significant mountain passes to prying Union eyes, it could advance north, unmolested, using South Mountain as a screen, deep into the heart of Pennsylvania.  Just as the valley was advantageous to the Confederates it was equally disadvantageous to the Federals.  An invading Northern army using the Valley as an avenue of invasion would travel southwest where the Valley empties toward no significant communication or population areas of the Confederacy.  The Great Valley was key to Army of Northern Virginia commander Robert E. Lee’s 1862 Maryland campaign as well as to the hopes of Confederate independence and sovereignty.[17]

          On three major occasions the Confederates used the Valley as an avenue of invasion and each foray resulted in a significant battle: in July of 1863 Lee’s advance precipitated the Gettysburg campaign, in July of 1864 the valley screened Maj. Gen. Jubal Early’s thrust toward Washington, and in September 1862 the valley was key to Lee’s Maryland campaign – his first Northern invasion.  In each of these campaigns the terrain of the region, especially the crucial mountain passes, were critical to the success or failure of the Confederates. [18]

          It must have been a mixture of elation and relief with which Lee reflected upon his decisive victory at Second Manassas in the final week of August 1862. That elation however could only have been tempered by the knowledge that to remain stationary was to jeopardize the fortunes of the people of the Shenandoah Valley, his army, and of the Confederacy itself. Though he nearly destroyed Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia on the Manassas plain he had to act quickly to maintain the initiative while the Federals were still disorganized and reeling from defeat.  “We cannot afford to be idle,” he wrote to Confederate president Jefferson Davis shortly after his victory at Manassas.[19]

         Lee found himself in a geographical dilemma: to go west would be to further denude the Shenandoah Valley of food and forage and exact a hardship upon the struggling people of the Valley on the eve of harvest.  To go east, although threatening to the Federal capital, would bring his army under the guns of a fortified Washington.  Remaining in place was out of the question as the area was stripped of food and other resources and to stand pat was to allow the shattered Union army time to regroup and wrest back the offensive.  Lee’s only option was to head north into Maryland.[20]

          Lee seized the opportunity that victory had granted him.  Using the momentum of success he went on the offensive, proposing to Confederate President Davis that it was the “most propitious time since the commencement of the war to enter Maryland.”[21]  Lee envisioned a campaign with multiple goals including liberating Maryland from the “despot’s heel” and of bringing the fire, destruction, and hardship of war to the very doorsteps of the Northern populace.[22]  The people of the North were already growing sick of the war and its great cost in both blood and treasure; with Lee’s proposed foray north perhaps they hadn’t seen the worst of it yet.  Lee hoped that one more decisive victory, this one on Northern soil, would influence the upcoming fall elections in the North in which the war-weary electorate might elect legislators willing to let the South go its own way.  Another goal was to encourage the great powers of Europe – Britain and France – to enter into the war on the side of the Confederacy; recognizing the South as a sovereign nation, forcing the North to the bargaining table, granting the South its independence and forever dividing the nation in two.  The hopes and aspirations of an independent Confederacy rode with Lee as he contemplated his next move.[23]

          Lee’s northward options lay in advancing to the west or the east of the Blue Ridge.  He opted to enter Maryland to the east of the mountains in a feint toward Washington DC forcing the Federal Army to concentrate forces in and around that city; with the Federals thus distracted and off balance Lee had a free hand to maneuver his forces for a strike northward.  Abraham Lincoln’s general-in-chief, the defensively minded Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, was ever aware of the vulnerability of the Federal capital, positioned as it was with Confederate Virginia on two of its flanks.  If Maryland were to rally to Lee’s colors and make common cause with the Confederacy Washington DC would be squarely within enemy territory.  Defense, first and foremost, was on the mind of Halleck.[24]  Halleck thus far in the war had hobbled all of his eastern theater commanders with the dual, and difficult, mission of going on the offensive against the Confederate army while at the same time maintaining a defensive posture in regards to defending Washington DC, essentially requiring his generals to do two opposite things simultaneously.  It put a succession of Northern commanders in a nearly untenable position and it was the same during the Maryland Campaign.

          Abraham Lincoln was in a desperate situation.  The Federal army of operation - Pope’s Army of Virginia, shattered at Second Manassas - had been reduced to a panic stricken and demoralized rabble.  Washington DC was under threat of Lee on the loose.  Lincoln needed a general who had the trust of the army, a general who could restore their morale and return them to fighting trim.  Against the objections of many in his cabinet Lincoln once again entrusted the fate of the nation to George B. McClellan.[25]

          “…Again I have been called upon to save the country,” McClellan wrote to his wife on September 5th.  It fell upon George B. McClellan, again placed in overall command, to take on the daunting task of reorganizing, from a combination of Pope’s broken Army, Burnside’s Carolina expeditionary force, and what remained of his own command into a reconstituted Army of the Potomac into a fit, strong, and battle-ready army.  McClellan had the abilities to organize and inspire the Federal army of operation in the East – his beloved Army of the Potomac – which he did with an inspired will to meet the emergency. [26]

          On September 4 ^th and 5^th Lee crossed his Army of Northern Virginia over the Potomac into Maryland.  Assessments of the actual numbers of effectives of the Army of Northern Virginia vary today as they did one hundred and fifty one years ago.  Although historians generally agree his army initially numbered some 64,000 men Lee immediately began suffering attrition in the ranks.  Many of his men were shoeless and were not be fit to march the macadamized roads of Maryland and accordingly they were ordered, with the sick and unfit,

 to stay behind at Lee’s new forward depot of operations at Winchester, Virginia. There were also numbers of men who were reluctant to cross the river into Maryland as they had joined the army to defend their homeland rather than to invade another. [27] Lastly were the great numbers of stragglers, men falling from the ranks through exhaustion or a reluctance to fight – a source of great frustration to Lee who estimated his losses from straggling at the opening of the campaign as between eight to ten thousand.[28]  In all it is estimated that Lee may have lost 20,000 men before the first shot was fired.

          Observing the Confederate crossing of the Potomac was a Lt. Miner at the Federal signal station on Sugarloaf Mountain.  Sugarloaf is a prominent feature of the terrain ten miles south of Frederick.  The low mountain lies quite isolated and provided commanding views of the Potomac fords used by Confederate Gen. D.H. Hill on September 5^th.  Miner was able, by way of signal flags, to report the crossing of a large body of Confederates at Leesburg providing McClellan with definitive confirmation of Lee’s thrust north.[29]  On September 6^th Miner was captured by Confederate cavalry and Sugarloaf was unavailable to the Federals while the bulk of Lee’s army crossed the river, leaving McClellan without reliable numbers regarding his enemy.[30]

          With the cavalry of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart screening his movements Lee crossed the Potomac, leading his army of veterans into Maryland.  Any hope of rallying Maryland to the rebel cause was quickly quashed as he received a decidedly chilly reception from the people of the Old Line state.  Nonetheless, at the head of his army he proceeded rapidly northward toward Frederick, the vanguard of his columns under Stonewall Jackson entering that city on September 6^th.  Again the rebels received a decidedly cool reception from most of the residents.  Lee encamped his army in the fields at the outskirts of the town where they spent the next three days refitting, reconnoitering, and resting.[31]

         As Lee contemplated his northward advance he identified a vulnerability to his new lines of supply and communication through Winchester.  Blocking that line were the Union garrisons at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg; forces of federals totaling some thirteen thousand of which twelve thousand were at Harpers Ferry and roughly twelve hundred at Martinsburg.  Lee fully expected both garrisons to withdraw upon his move north, thus opening his lines to his base of operations at Winchester.  Regarding Harpers Ferry, Lee instructed General John Walker thus: “The position is necessary to us, not to garrison and hold, but because in the hands of the enemy it would be a break in our new lines of communications with Richmond.”[32]  Realizing that the Federals would be to his rear as he moved north Lee concluded those Federal forces needed to be neutralized if success were to be gained in Maryland, to that end Lee would dispatch nearly two-thirds of his already depleted army, some 28,000 men, under Maj. Gen. Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson to Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry to force those nearly indefensible towns to surrender.  Meanwhile Lee, with the rest of his army planned to proceed northward toward Hagerstown, Maryland.[33]

          The attack on Harpers Ferry as well as other instructions to his various generals were detailed in Lee’s now famous ”Special Orders 191” issued on September 9^th in which Lee laid out in detail his plans for his Maryland operation.  Included in that order were Jackson’s marching orders for Harpers Ferry, Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill’s rearguard activities at Boonsboro and Longstreet’s advance toward Hagerstown.  Lee was on a tight invasion timetable and detaching nearly two-thirds of his army to reduce Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry would make him particularly vulnerable.  Accordingly Jackson was under orders to effect the surrender of those towns no later than September 12 at which time he would hasten his forces to rejoin the Army in the vicinity of Boonsboro or Hagerstown, the latter being the logical jumping off point for a thrust into Pennsylvania, a move which Lee was beginning to contemplate. [34]

          Lee issued his orders and on September 10^th, Jackson, Walker, and Maj. Gen Lafayette McLaws departed Frederick and by three routes advanced toward their targets - Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, Virginia [attachment B]. In that advance Jackson had the greatest distance to travel - from Frederick to Martinsburg thence to Harpers Ferry.  He expected little resistance although the distance to be travelled and Lee’s tight invasion timetable left little room for error or miscalculation.

         Jackson, as Lee, expected the Martinsburg garrison to flee, as they did, though they did not expect them to go to Harpers Ferry which was in turn the case.  Jackson further expected the Federals to evacuate Harpers Ferry without a fight.  In that he would be disappointed.  Unforeseen circumstances were causing Jackson to disrupt Lee’s timetable.[35]

          Terrain was crucial to the defense or to the defeat of the Harpers Ferry garrison.  The town lies at the confluence of two great rivers – the Potomac and the Shenandoah and is overtopped and surrounded by three key terrain features – Louden, Maryland, and Bolivar Heights. Possession of these three heights would determine the fortunes or misfortunes of the Federal garrison below.  On September 13^th the Confederates were moving into position around Harpers Ferry – one day behind schedule.[36]

          Visitors to Harpers Ferry National Historic Park, when hiking up the Maryland Heights trail, are greeted with a breathtaking and commanding view of the town below, however it is only from one or two select vantage points that the town is visible as the heights are heavily wooded providing only a limited impression of the advantage of the terrain for the Confederates. At the time of the Civil War Maryland Heights was far less wooded than today and Louden and Bolivar heights were almost totally denuded of trees, the forests reduced in the manufacture of charcoal. Once those heights were gained the Confederates would have numerous commanding views for their gunners of their hapless prey below. [37]

          As Jackson was marshalling his forces on the terrain above Harpers Ferry, Lee, with Longstreet and D.H. Hill, was leaving Frederick, that was the moment he committed himself to what may have been an intended strike into Pennsylvania.  Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis “I propose to enter Pennsylvania, unless you should deem it unadvisable upon political or other grounds.” Lee turned west, marching up and over South Mountain and entered the Cumberland Valley.  As he looked north he saw an open road all the way to Harrisburg Pennsylvania. [38] 

          Lee directed D.H. Hill and Stuart to hold the three passes through the mountain: Frosttown Gap, Turner’s Gap, and Crampton’s Gap, while he with Longstreet marched through Boonsboro and north to Hagerstown.  The terrain of the valley as well as the strong network of roads provided easy marching for the rested Confederates.  Lee confidently urged his troops northward all the while conscious of the need for Harpers Ferry to be taken with haste allowing Jackson, Walker, and McLaws to rejoin the main column for the thrust north for which Hagerstown would be their rendezvous and jumping off point as detailed in Special Orders 191.[39] 

          Deep in enemy territory, and heading deeper, outnumbered more than two to one, Lee’s audacious plan hinged on two things happening: the first that McClellan would move with his customary slowness and second, that Harpers Ferry, where most of his army was tied up, would surrender quickly.  Lee was making an enormous gamble.

          Col. Dixon Miles commanded the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry.  Miles was an officer whose abilities were found wanting earlier in the war.   He had been shuttled off to a safe role at Harpers Ferry commanding troops whose primary mission was guarding the railroad.   Miles, aware of the approach of the Confederates, made preparations to defend the town.  Despite the addition of some 1,200 Federals – the Martinsburg garrison – Miles was in a difficult, and soon to be untenable, situation.  He had to determine the best positions in which to deploy his limited assets.  Miles deployed, with little imagination, only meager resources of men and artillery on the most dominant feature of the terrain - the towering Maryland Heights - the key to success or failure of defense of the town below.[40]  

          As the various portions of Lee’s army drew further apart in pursuit of their objectives occurred one of history’s most compelling and improbable episodes.  Through carelessness on the part of a Confederate courier, a copy of Lee’s Special Orders 191 fell into the hands of George B. McClellan. The document made clear the location and mission of each element of Lee’s scattered army.  The Federal commander now knew that Lee’s army was spread out over a twenty six-mile front, divided up into five groups.  Lee was completely vulnerable and the initiative was sliding toward McClellan.  A triumphant McClellan wired Lincoln: “I have all the plans of the rebels and will catch them in their own trap.”[41]

          For all of the information SO 191 provided McClellan regarding the location of Lee’s army it was sphinxlike regarding information on the actual number of troops available to Lee.  McClellan, on this campaign, as with his others, labored under the anxiety that he was vastly outnumbered by the Confederates – perhaps by as many as one hundred fifty thousand, when the most available to Lee was roughly a third of that number, SO 191 provided nothing to inform McClellan with such key information.  The head of his secret service, Allan Pinkerton is usually cited as the source of such inflated numbers, however Pinkerton played almost no role on this campaign.  McClellan’s source for the number of Lee’s army came primarily from his chief of cavalry Gen. Alfred Pleasonton as well as from the governor of Pennsylvania Andrew Curtin, both of whom were reporting grossly exaggerated numbers of Confederates.[42]  Curtin reported to Lincoln that Lee had 190,000 men in Maryland.[43] Pleasonton reported A.P. Hill’s division of 5,000 men to have been thirty thousand.[44] Despite himself, with SO 191 in hand, McClellan began to move with uncharacteristic celerity, and this would not escape the notice of Lee who quickly determined that the game was up.  The initiative was now McClellan’s and all Lee could do was react to the actions of his enemy.[45]

         Simultaneous with the Confederate investment of Harpers Ferry, fifteen miles to the north Confederates under D.H. Hill, acting as the rear-guard of Lee’s army, prepared to defend the passes through South Mountain from the now rapidly advancing Federals of the I, IX and VI corps under Maj. Gens. Joseph, Hooker, Jesse Reno, and William B. Franklin respectively.  Informed by the information in Lee’s “lost order” the pace of the Federals had taken on an urgency that was duly noted by Lee.  He suspected that somehow McClellan had become apprised of his intentions.[46]

          Today’s hikers of the Appalachian Trail along the crest of South Mountain experience the terrain defended by Hill’s Confederates. To wander off of the trail is to find oneself in an inhospitable jumble of large boulders and sharp granitic spines.  The only relief from the rugged terrain of the mountaintop lay in the very narrow passes which accommodated the three roads which crossed the mountain from east to west, upon which three Federal columns were rapidly advancing.  D.H. Hill quickly dispatched his small force from Boonsboro to the passes on the crest of the mountain.  His role had gone from one of observing enemy activity to now being the bulwark holding back a massive Union assault and buying time for Lee to gather his scattered forces.  It was September 14^th, Harpers Ferry was still in Union hands and Lee was without nearly two-thirds of his army.[47]

          The fighting at South Mountain developed in the afternoon of September 14.  Joseph Hooker’s I Corps, to the north advanced toward Frosttown Gap, Reno of the IX Corps climbed the heights toward Turner’s Gap, and Franklin, commanding the VI Corps advanced toward Crampton’s Gap.  It was Franklin who was marching under the most ambitious of McClellan’s orders.  Once Franklin drove the Confederates from the gap he would have broken Lee’s Army in half – Longstreet to the north and Jackson to the south.  Once gaining the gap Franklin was to proceed down the western slope of the mountain into Pleasant Valley between South Mountain and Elk Ridge.  Upon the Pleasant Valley Road Franklin was to advance toward Harpers Ferry with the aim of relieving that garrison and defeating McLaw’s troops on Maryland Heights.  Franklin’s column, augmented with the Harpers Ferry garrison was then to countermarch back along the Pleasant Valley road to Boonsboro and take the Williamsport road to the fords of the Potomac thus cutting Longstreet off from a route of retreat.  Even in the hands of a general more capable than the unimaginative Franklin this would have been a heroic task to complete. [48]

          As the battle of South Mountain was underway, Jackson at Harpers Ferry, with McLaws and Walker now in position, sprung his trap.  McLaws had little difficulty, though some delay, in dislodging the meager Federal force fruitlessly trying to hold Maryland Heights.  With the most significant terrain now in his possession McLaws positioned his guns, and in concert with the rest of the Confederates on Louden Heights and Bolivar Heights the shelling of Harpers Ferry opened.[49]

          Lee, twenty six miles to the north, becoming apprehensive of the unfolding situation at South Mountain and still in ignorance of the situation at Harpers Ferry, determined to gather his forces toward Boonsboro for a retreat back into Virginia at Williamsport or Shepherdstown via Sharpsburg.  His campaign, mounted with such optimistic determination a week previous, was now coming to pieces.  Had Lee known of developments at Harpers Ferry he might have been more sanguine.[50]

          With McLaws’ seizure of Maryland Heights and A.P. Hill’s flanking movement driving the Federals from Bolivar Heights the Confederates were in possession of the superior terrain with commanding views of Harpers Ferry below.  Jackson - a former West Point artillery instructor - opened fire on the federals who were forced into the cramped confines of the bowl that was Harpers Ferry town, gamely endeavoring to hold on as ordered, to the “last extremity.”  The encircled Federal’s only cause for optimism was the sound of Franklin’s ever-approaching artillery and a hope that relief was on the way.[51]

          As Franklin proceeded down the Pleasant Valley road he could hear the Confederate guns above Harpers Ferry and hastened his troops forward.  The marching was easy and the weather was fair. The temperature at 7:00 a.m. was 62 degrees – perfect weather for a road march. The terrain of Pleasant Valley is, as its name implies, gently rolling with a sound road; terrain well suited for movement.  Everything was propitious for advancing with alacrity.  After a decisive victory the day before at Crampton’s Gap one can only imagine that the morale of the 12,000 veterans of the Peninsula and Seven Days campaigns was buoyed by the thought of rescuing the beleaguered garrison of Harpers Ferry, scant miles ahead.  The men of the VI Corps were equal to the task; their commander, William B. Franklin, was another matter entirely. [52]

          Two miles from his destination Franklin encountered Confederates in line of battle deployed to the right and left of the Pleasant Valley Road. McLaws, leaving Maryland Heights in the possession of artillery, had taken his division in a retrograde movement down the heights toward the Pleasant Valley Road to meet Franklin.  Although McLaws was considerably outnumbered he arrayed his troops in a manner to appear a larger force than they actually were.  Franklin, fomenting a great lost opportunity, halted and deployed his troops to face McLaws.  Deceived by McLaws’ bluff, and considering his next move, the sound of firing from Harpers Ferry suddenly ceased and Franklin realized that his mission had failed and that Harpers Ferry had fallen.[53] 

          Franklin held his position until the morning of September 17, ordered by McClellan to keep the VI Corps in Pleasant Valley until he knew with a certainty which route Jackson would take to move north, for if Jackson were to come up through Pleasant Valley he would be on the Army of the Potomac’s left flank; Franklin was to guard against that possibility.[54] McLaws held his position until the surrender of Harpers Ferry and then was ordered back to that town by Jackson, leaving a picket line as a rear guard.  McLaws’ division then crossed the Potomac with Jackson and proceeded north, on the Virginia side of the river, toward Sharpsburg, Maryland. A.P. Hill meanwhile, was left behind to process the parole of 13,000 federal prisoners and to send the large amounts of valuable captured materiel of war south to Winchester, Virginia.  The situation was brightening, if only slightly, for Lee.[55]

         In the final moments of the lopsided struggle at Harpers Ferry one of the last Confederate artillery shots of the siege felled Dixon Miles, mortally wounded; taking with him any accounting of why he relinquished the most crucial terrain to the grave and beyond the reach of the subsequent court of inquiry into the debacle at Harpers Ferry.  Although a victory for Jackson, it came at the expense of time.  By the time Miles surrendered Jackson was two and a half days behind the schedule as outlined in SO 191.  [56]

          A court of inquiry was convened in October of 1862 to determine culpability for the surrender of Harpers Ferry to the Confederates.   Examination of witnesses focused upon the premature withdrawal by Union forces from the stronghold of Maryland Heights.  Testimony was given in which witnesses asserted that had the entire garrison been posted upon the heights, supported by Federal artillery, the Confederates would have been stymied in their efforts to seize Harpers Ferry, and even more importantly, that Jackson would have been delayed in rejoining Lee.  This could have provided McClellan with the opportunity to utterly destroy the Army of Northern Virginia.[57]

          Dixon Miles was posthumously excoriated by the court of inquiry for “disgracefully” surrendering his post.  The court concluded  “Colonel Miles’ incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility, led to the shameful surrender of this important post.”[58]  Because of Miles’ apparent inability to assess the crucial aspects of terrain, Harpers Ferry fell and the Confederates were able to reunite thus preventing what might have been a more decisive Union victory at Antietam and, perhaps, an earlier end to the war.

          Lee, hearing the firing cease at Harpers Ferry, knew that his scattered army would be making its way to him with all haste.  It was time for Lee to gather those forces, ordering his divisions to a defensible position.  This was Lee’s first experience fighting in mountainous terrain and thus far the terrain, in the instance of the fighting upon South Mountain, had taxed the abilities of one of his divisions and saw it driven into retreat.  In another instance - Harpers Ferry - the mountains worked to his utter advantage funneling the Union garrison into an untenable position resulting in victory for Jackson.  Lee’s army, stretched along a twenty six mile line in the lower Cumberland Valley now drew itself in, toward the rolling terrain outside of Sharpsburg and the banks of Antietam Creek - the place where Lee, forced by circumstances, determined to make his stand.[59]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                               Chapter II

                        The Terrain of Antietam: The Battle North of Sharpsburg

No one who ever campaigned with McClellan or Lee in September 1862, can ever forget the incomparable beauty of the valleys of western Maryland…Loveliest of these is the Antietam Valley extending from the South Mountain to the Potomac.  As one descends the National road from Turner’s Gap, going westward, the valley spreads out before the vision in charming, graceful undulations to the north and west; to the southwest is seen the wavy outline of Elk Ridge which bisects the valley from Harper’s Ferry northward, and sinks down upon its

bosom near Keedysville.

                                                                                                               Ezra Carman[60]

Ezra Carman’s idyllic 1894 description of the Antietam Creek valley belies the nature of what occurred there thirty-two years earlier on September 17^th, 1862; the day which was arguably America’s greatest calamity.

          The “bosom” of that valley was far from lovely as far as the armies were concerned.  The fighting which opened the Battle of Antietam saw unit commanders forced to relinquish their autonomy to the vagaries of terrain, forced by the landforms into positions favorable to some and disastrous to others.

          At the floor of the Cumberland Valley in Washington County Maryland is the Antietam Creek valley.  Antietam Creek originates in the very southern tier of Pennsylvania and empties into the Potomac River just four miles south of Sharpsburg Maryland.  It is Sharpsburg and the rolling hills around it that played host to nearly one hundred twenty thousand armed men in mid-September of 1862.

          The Antietam Creek valley is sandwiched between two significant geographical features – South Mountain and the Potomac River.  “The ground is peculiar” is how one newspaper correspondent described the terrain in this area of compression.[61]   South Mountain is a volcanic and granitic formation over a billion years old, once rivaling the modern Rocky Mountains.  Time has eroded the Blue Ridge (of which South Mountain is a component) into the gently rounded and modest mountain range of today.  However, its skeletal remains, in the form of long outcroppings and ridges of stone, springs and undulations of ground remain and typify the terrain of the Antietam Creek Valley and it is these features which influenced and often determined the ebb and flow of the battle.[62]

          With the fall of Harpers Ferry, Lee grasped the moment.  He ordered his columns including D.H. Hill - still reeling from being driven off of South Mountain - Longstreet at Hagerstown, and Jackson’s forces now hastening from Harpers Ferry to advance toward Keedysville and Sharpsburg beyond.  JEB Stuart acted as the rearguard while Lee’s disparate forces marched west on the Shepherdstown pike to their rendezvous at Sharpsburg. [63]

         As Lee reached Boonsboro from Hagerstown he had a decision to make: where to find a place to give battle that had a line of retreat should he need it? To go northwest to Williamsport and its fords back into Virginia or to go southwest to Sharpsburg with its access to Shepherdstown?  It was the terrain of Sharpsburg, its defensible ridges, the roads leading to it, and its immediate access to a line of retreat through Shepherdstown, Virginia which made Sharpsburg the logical place to rally his scattered forces.[64]

           Sharpsburg lies at the apex of the Hagerstown and Shepherdstown pikes and is between the Potomac River to the west and Antietam Creek to the east.  By making his stand at Sharpsburg Lee was operating counter to the very precepts of warfare which he himself had taught as an instructor at the Military Academy – he would be fighting a superior force with a broad river at his back - a potentially disastrous position to place one’s army in.  The audacious Lee however would use that river to his advantage.[65] 

          Two large loop-like bends occur on the river near Sharpsburg, one to the north and the other to the south of Sharpsburg, those loops figured into Lee’s selection of the ground on which to fight.  Lee would anchor his flanks upon those bends using them as natural barriers against attack.  To his rear, three miles west of Sharpsburg on a strong, straight, and direct road lay the Potomac ford at Shepherdstown, Virginia [attachment C].  That road to Shepherdstown could be Lee’s escape route; indeed Lee posted his excess artillery at that ford to insure its possession during and immediately following the battle.[66]

          The terrain north of Sharpsburg is comprised of a long ridge of high ground nearly two miles long; it was along that ridge that Lee chose to establish the left wing of his line.  When one stands upon that ridge today, with its commanding views and unlimited fields of fire, it becomes clear how Lee was using the terrain to shape the coming battle.  His enemy would be advancing uphill over ground vulnerable to Lee’s artillery.[67]

          Immediately to the rear of Lee’s left wing ran the Hagerstown Pike, a very broad, strong road connecting Sharpsburg with Hagerstown to the north.  Lee, on interior lines of communication, would be able to utilize the pike to his great advantage by shuttling his assets quickly and efficiently from one end of his line to the other; taking men and guns from where they were not so critically needed and plugging them into positions where they were desperately needed.  Lee, by selecting terrain served by the Hagerstown Pike, may also illuminate his thinking for contingencies following a victory at Sharpsburg; if successful Lee would have the pike to take his army north, as was his original intent, all the way to Pennsylvania.[68]

          In addition to the ridge Lee was deploying his men upon, there was another ridge, nearly equal in length to the rear of his position which would provide a strong fall-back position while still guarding the ford to Shepherdstown and home.  Although Lee would face criticism for the position he chose, it appears a logical one for a general who hadn’t yet given up on the idea of defeating McClellan and moving into Pennsylvania.[69]

          To lose Sharpsburg would be to lose his line of retreat.  Although Lee was confident of victory, he was a realist.  Being outnumbered nearly two to one he must have been acutely aware that the coming battle could go against him and if that were to happen he needed that Potomac crossing to get his army to Virginia and to safety.  To lose Sharpsburg was to lose all: he must hang on to Sharpsburg.[70]

         As Lee waited for Jackson to join him he was developing a strong position, placing his men and guns on that two-mile long ridge of high ground just north of Sharpsburg.  If Lee could get his 40,000 men and his 240 guns on that high ground he would turn that ridge into a fortress, and just as every fortress needs a moat Lee had one – Antietam Creek.  There were only three bridges that crossed the creek; Lower and Middle bridges Lee had covered with guns; Upper Bridge however was a different matter.  Lee did not have the resources to cover that bridge and that would provide an opportunity for McClellan later on. [71]        

          By the afternoon of September 15^th with Jackson’s columns hastening from Harpers Ferry to join Lee, 20,000 Confederates positioned themselves along Lee’s line with more arriving by the hour.  Across the creek to his east the lead elements of the Army of the Potomac arrived at Keedysville just two miles before Sharpsburg.  McClellan established his headquarters at the Phillip Pry house on a very high ridge east of Sharpsburg just outside of Keedysville.  The terrain of the Pry House ridge was one of only two positions held by McClellan with an elevation of 450 feet or greater.  By contrast fully 40 percent of Lee’s line was at that elevation; “Our position overcrowned theirs a little” Longstreet modestly observed.  McClellan established the center of his line upon the high ground of the Pry ridge.[72]

          The Pry ridge provided a “comprehensive view” and it was there that McClellan could view the position of his long-range guns; 20 - pounder Parrott rifles just above Middle Bridge across the Shepherdstown Pike. With a reach of two and one half miles it was these guns which would dominate much of the battlefield in the coming contest.  Those guns and McClellan’s nearby presence are emblematic of the importance of the terrain of the position. The Shepherdstown/Boonsboro Pike at Middle Bridge was the key to McClellan’s center, the route of his lines of supply and communication, and most importantly – the front door to Washington DC.  It was there that McClellan placed his reserves – the V Corps – under one of his most trusted lieutenants Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter.  At all costs McClellan had to hold that position against what he believed to be a force of Confederates far larger than what it actually was. The terrain at his center and the advantages it presented were key in McClellan’s defensive strategy as well as to the offensive deployment of his long-range artillery. [73]

          By the afternoon of the 16^th the two armies were in position with the bulk of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia extending from the north of Sharpsburg along the ridge into the village and down to the creek valley below.  Lee anchored his left upon Nicodemus Heights, a commanding ridge where he placed sixteen guns of Stuart’s horse artillery.  Extending beyond Nicodemus Heights were mounted Confederate pickets connecting Lee’s extreme left with the bend in the Potomac guarding Lee’s left flank from attack.[74]

          As McClellan’s various corps arrived they deployed on the east side of Antietam Creek to the north and south of the Boonsboro Pike.  Hooker’s I Corps was directed to the North followed by Maj. Gen. Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps.  The IX Corps, now under Cox after the killing of Reno, deployed to the south of the pike.  In the upcoming fight the IX Corps would be at a disadvantage of leadership.  On the advance from Washington McClellan had divided his army into three semi-autonomous “wings”.  Burnside commanded the wing comprised of the I and IX Corps.  Following the Battle of South Mountain McClellan reverted to the individual corps structure superseding the wing structure.  Burnside, on the eve of the upcoming battle still operated under the impression that he was a wing commander, thus the IX Corps was under the practical command of Cox under the supervision of Burnside.  This clumsy chain of command would seriously hamper the IX Corps in the upcoming battle.  The II Corps was still en route, the V Corps was at the center, and Franklin’s VI Corps, under McClellan’s orders, was still in Pleasant Valley protecting the left flank of the Army of the Potomac.[75]

          McClellan intended to open the fight on the 15^th but the day dawned foggy and only two of his divisions were in position, thus McClellan spent the day reconnoitering the terrain, adjusting his lines, and placing his guns.  Had he known how weak Lee’s army was at that moment an attack may have meant the destruction of Lee’s army.  A lack of visibility on the field and a lack of aggressiveness on the part of McClellan passed the day without a shot being fired; all the while Lee’s troops continued to gather.[76]

          The Army of the Potomac was arrayed on the eastern side of the creek probing for opportunities and weakness in Lee’s forward line.  That opportunity came at Upper Bridge.

Upper Bridge was unguarded by the understrength Lee and it was there, at the bridge and adjacent fords, that McClellan ordered Hooker to cross Antietam Creek and to advance into what became the northern end of the battlefield.  It was in the late afternoon of the 16^th that the opening shots were fired - skirmishing mostly.  Had Hooker driven past the thin line of Confederate cavalry pickets on Longstreet’s left he could have enveloped Lee’s flank and taken Lee in flank and rear but such was not the case.  Hooker settled for desultory skirmishing and a fierce artillery duel with little tactical effect other than causing McClellan to tip his hand; the battle was to begin the following day and Lee knew it would be on his left.[77]

          When one stands on the highest ground in the center of the historic Cornfield today a nearly complete panorama of the northern end of the field is available to view[78].  Looking to the north one sees the Poffenberger ridge stretching east to west, just beyond the ridge is visible the roof of the barn of the Joseph Poffenberger farm.  Along the ridge at the time of the battle was North Woods, the smallest of the three significant woodlots on this end of the field at the time of the battle.  Although only one “witness tree” remains of the North Woods there is a Park Service effort underway to replant much of the North Woods to its 1862 footprint.  Looking west the Hagerstown Pike is visible as the western border of the Cornfield and in the distance beyond the pike is Nicodemus Heights, at 500 feet in elevation it dominates much of the field.  To the southwest from our vantage point is the West Woods and Dunker Church on the eponymous plateau.  The West Woods, nearly gone twenty years ago, has been completely reforested, though the trees are generations from maturity, one is able to see how the woods affected sight lines during the battle.  Noteworthy was the nature of the woodlots at the time of the battle.  Today the woods have gone wild with a brushy understory, however at the time of the battle they were nearly park-like as sheep and goats were left to graze beneath what Palfrey refers to as “most noble trees, almost entirely free of underbrush” providing far more visibility than today.[79]  Visibility was, however, affected by numerous rock outcroppings, ravines, and undulations of the ground throughout the woods.  Dunker Church plateau is connected to a long ridge running along the Hagerstown Pike to Sharpsburg two miles to the south, and visible from our vantage point in the center of the Cornfield.  Looking due south one is able to see high ground – the eastern extension of Dunker Church plateau; today it is the location of the visitor center and beyond that, to the southeast, lies the Sunken Road.  In the distance beyond the Sunken Road are three ridges growing progressively higher; Red Hill in the foreground with the Pry house – McClellan’s headquarters just visible, Elk Ridge beyond that and to the east, South Mountain in the far distance.  Completing the visual transit from the center of the Cornfield looking northeast is the historic East Woods much of which remains wooded and as with the West Woods there has been a significant amount of replanting.  The vistas available to today’s visitor are generally those of the men of 1862 - so unchanged is much of the landscape of the park.

Nicodemus Heights and Dunker Church plateau

          Nicodemnus Heights was a key position on Lee’s left and within Jackson’s sphere of influence and it was upon that height that Lee anchored his left flank.  With an elevation of 500 feet it commanded much of the northern end of the field.  Furthermore, guns placed upon this high ground were just beyond the long reach of the Union 20-pounders above Middle Bridge.  Stuart’s horse artillery was placed on the flank of the I Corps and their effect upon the advance of that body of men would prove to be lethal.  Jackson exploited the terrain of his position to full advantage. [80]

          As the artillery dueled above them, Hooker formed his corps in multiple parallel lines of battle stretching from east to west all facing to the south toward the Confederates on the Dunker Church plateau.  As Hooker rode to the crest of the ridge, field glasses clapped to his eyes, he could see the Dunker Church, like a beacon, its whitewashed walls reflecting the meager light available on that misty morning.  He directed his divisional commanders to advance toward the high ground occupied by the church, and the Confederates to be found there.[81]

          It had been a miserable night for the 12,500 men of Hooker’s I Corps.[82]  They had bivouacked for a short night of little sleep and no fires to warm them or their coffee.  They were in and around the Joseph Poffenberger farmstead.  The buildings of the Poffenberger farm today are little changed from their 1862 appearance.  When walking the ground one can see that the men were in a bowl-shaped depression, protected to the front by the low Poffenberger ridge running east to west.  Beyond and above them were the Poffenberger heights where Monroe, Reynolds, and Simpson’s batteries of Federal guns were positioned.  To their right was Nicodemus Heights, and although the men of the I Corps in their present position were safe from Stuart’s sixteen guns the Federal batteries were not, and a deafening artillery duel began in the predawn hours between opposing batteries.  The men of the I Corps had little time to shudder under the thunder as at 5:45 a.m. their battle commenced.[83]

          As the ranks of the I Corps emerged from the North Woods on the southern slope of the Poffenberger ridge they became visible to Stuart’s guns composed of Pelham’s, Carpenter’s, and Wooding’s batteries.[84]  The Confederate batteries opened a blistering enfilading fire upon Hooker’s flanks with devastating effect, 12-pounder balls running out of victims before they ran out of momentum.  Stuart exploited the terrain of the ridge perfectly by positioning his guns on the rearward slope just below the crest.  In this manner Stuart was able to exact great damage against the advancing Federals while presenting only a very small target to the Federal guns.  Nicodemus Heights was the commanding feature of terrain and it was to Hooker’s woe that he had not appreciated as much the day before when it was within his grasp.[85]

          Hooker’s Corps was comprised of three divisions totaling some 12,500 men, facing their advance were no more than 5,500 men under Jackson.  For a time the disparity in numbers was made up for by Confederate artillery on superior terrain. Stuart’s guns exacted a great toll on Hooker’s lines; however they were shooting at a moving target.  Eventually trees and terrain intervened between Stuart’s batteries and the advancing ranks of the I Corps and the Confederates lost a clear field of vision.  Their work, for the moment complete, the Rebel batteries limbered up and relocated south to Hauser Ridge from whence they would continue their contribution at a later hour.[86]

          Free now of the enfilading fire from Nicodemus Heights, Hooker reformed his ranks and resumed his southward advance toward the Dunker Church plateau – the keystone of the Confederate line.  Before him and to the east of the Hagerstown pike was a 30 acre cornfield; forever to be known as the Cornfield.  Hooker’s men plunged into the head high corn and advanced southward, now coming under fire from the nineteen Confederate guns positioned on the Dunker Church plateau (where the visitor center is today).  As with Stuart’s guns, the five batteries under artillery battalion commander Col. Stephen D. Lee, upon commanding terrain, firing case and canister, exacted a heavy toll upon the lead division of Hooker’s corps, however unlike the guns on Nicodemus heights these guns were within the grasp of the Union 20-pounders on the Pry House ridge.  In this instance the Federals worked superior terrain to their great advantage pouring a blistering long-range fire into the Confederate guns on the Dunker Church plateau, forcing them to retire leaving shattered guns, limbers, and men in their wake.[87]

The West Woods

          On Hooker’s right in the advance line of the I Corps marched the four regiments of the “Iron Brigade”.  The 7^th and 2^nd Wisconsin were deployed to the east of the Hagerstown Pike and the 19^th Indiana and 6^th Wisconsin to the west as they advanced southward toward the West Woods and Dunker Church.  The path of the 19 ^th and 6 ^th ran parallel to both the pike and to a pronounced and long ridge of limestone outcropping.  This outcropping appears in numerous reports of the battle and was a feature of the terrain which figured large to the benefit and the woe of both Union and Confederate. Sheltering along and behind the natural breastwork comprised of the stone outcropping were Confederates of Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom’s brigade.  As the Federals advanced the Confederates opened a devastating enfilading fire upon them.[88]

          That particular rocky ridge changed possession two more times to good offensive effect. In each instance this terrain feature was exploited by tactical exigency rather than by plan – by luck rather than generalship.  Intact and visible today, this 300 yard-long outcropping of limestone is emblematic of the minor terrain features that figured large in the experience of regimental commanders. [89]

          Eventually, after much combat, the Iron Brigade along with the rest of the I Corps retired from the field, battered and exhausted, the mantle of fighting now taken up by the 7,000 men of the Union XII Corps under Mansfield. [90]  Mansfield’s three divisions emerged from the East Woods at 6:30 a.m. and proceeded through the Cornfield and advanced southwest toward the West Woods.  The 1,727 Federals of the 1^st and 2^nd Brigades of the 2 ^nd division, commanded by Brig. Gen. George Sears Greene, initially advancing along the same line of the rest of the XII Corps, was, upon emerging from the East Woods, presented with an opportunity too good to pass up – the exposed flanks of two Confederate regiments.  Greene formed line of battle and engaged the unsuspecting Confederates. “The division encountered the enemy in the first woods in our front and drove them before it.”[91]  Greene continued his advance engaging the enemy all the while until, his ammunition depleted, he halted, just west of the burning Mumma house and barn in a bowl-shaped depression – a swale – and sent runners back for ammunition.  While he waited for replenishment he ordered his men to shelter in the swale, which would become a key terrain feature in the course of the battle.  By this time the rest of the XII Corps, after fierce fighting in and around the Cornfield, was driven from the field, leaving only Greene and his division in their detached position.  As Greene mounted the high ground just beyond the swale he was able to see the 5,600 Federals of Sedgwick’s Division of Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner’s II Corps making their advance from the East Woods, through the Cornfield, toward the West Woods.  As the Federals entered the West Woods Greene could only have concluded that his right flank was thus covered, the now lightly defended Dunker Church plateau – the “hinge” of Lee’s line - was within his grasp and he had only to wait for the ammunition to come up to resume his advance.[92]

          By 7:00 a.m. the Cornfield had changed hands numerous times, the balance of battle shifting from Union to Confederate and back again repeatedly.  The Union I Corps, with Hooker, taken from the field wounded, was eventually driven from the field. Following Hooker the XII Corps was similarly unable to dislodge the Confederates from the northern end of the field, thence the hopes of the Federals rested upon the 15,000 men of Maj. Gen. Edwin V.Sumner’s II Corps.[93]

          Sumner’s objective was the West Woods; to take that position would be to break the hinge of Lee’s line and provide Sumner with the opportunity to roll up Lee’s left flank all the way to Sharpsburg, cutting his army in half and depriving him of his escape route.  It was, in the inevitability of hindsight, a propitious moment.[94]

          Sumner was eager to get his II Corps divisions across Antietam Creek and into the fight.  He had been at McClellan’s Pry house headquarters since dawn, and finally at 7:20 he received his marching orders.  Hastening back to his troops he formed his divisions into line of battle.  His second division under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick took the lead and his third division led by Maj. Gen. William B. French would follow directly and take position advancing on Sedgwick’s left.  Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson’s first division was ordered to stay on the east bank of the Antietam until relieved by Gen. George W. Morell’s division of the V Corps at which time he was to follow French.  Sumner stepped off with 11,000 men; that which followed is what Francis W. Palfrey, an eyewitness to the events, referred to as “A disaster of the first magnitude.”[95]

          Sumner wasted no time.  He formed Sedgwick’s line on a brigade front – six lines deep, with no troops on the flanks to guard against attacks from left or right.  Palfrey writes the distance between his lines was no more than “30 paces”, not room enough to maneuver or change front to meet any crisis.  Sumner acted as though the enemy was solely to his front, and in those early moments of the advance he was quite correct.  At that moment there was a lull in the fighting, the Cornfield littered with the dead and dying but no Confederate resistance.  Sumner saw a clear path before him - a path leading to ultimate victory.  At 9:00 a.m. Sedgwick’s division stepped off and the advance began.[96]

          Sumner, at the head of Sedgwick’s division, led the westward advance.  So rapidly did he advance that he widened the gap between Sedgwick and French.  By the time French’s division emerged from the East woods so much time and terrain had intervened between Sedgwick’s division and French’s that French could neither see nor hear that division which had preceded him.  Scanning the ground through his field glasses, anxious to determine the line of march, his eyes caught sight of a large body of Union troops, not where he had expected, but further to the left, nonetheless believing that was the division of Sedgwick, he led his lines of battle southward toward what he believed to be Sumner and the second division.  In actuality, what he was marching toward was the 1,700 men of the division of George Sears Greene in the Mumma swale, still awaiting ammunition.  Neither Sumner nor Sedgwick knew that the second division would be making its advance alone and with its left flank “in the air” – utterly unprotected.[97]

          The terrain of the West Woods has all of the rock outcroppings of other portions of the northern end of the battlefield and additionally it is furrowed with long and deep ravines running south to north.  It is that terrain upon which turned the tide of battle to the advantage of the Confederates.  From the high ground on which he was surveying the ground Sumner would have been able to see Greene’s division to his left.  It is logical to assume Sumner thought that his left was supported. Sumner plunged into the West Woods, initially meeting almost no resistance.  His plan was going to perfection, and little did he know that Confederates under McLaws and Brig. Gen. William Barksdale were rushing from the center of Lee’s line to meet him.[98]

          Historian Joseph Harsh writes “Luck is as important in war as intelligence” and nowhere was that more apparent than in McLaws arrival at the West Woods.  As Confederates McLaws and Barksdale hastened toward the sound of battle the terrain literally forced their direction.  Command decision making was subjugated to the terrain.  Barksdale and McLaws had, by dint of the terrain, lost much of their command autonomy to the exigencies of the terrain.  They were funneled by the terrain into deep ravines through which they pushed forward only to emerge, by mere good luck, in the most advantageous of positions on the flank and rear of Sedgwick’s line.[99]

          Simultaneous to the arrival of McLaws and Barksdale, Sedgwick’s division was just emerging from the far side of the West Woods only to be greeted by blistering volleys of canister administered by Stuart’s guns recently removed from Nicodemus Heights to their new and lethal position on Hauser Ridge, directly to the front of Sedgwick’s line.  Suddenly Sedgwick found himself under fire from three directions.  The tight formation of his successive lines left him almost no room for maneuver; there were instances of Federal soldiers firing into the backs of other Federals believing in the smoke and utter chaos that they were engaging Confederates.  All was confusion and near panic.  Sumner frantically attempted to coordinate the jumbled lines of Federals, but by then the debacle was so far advanced that he could only order his desperate brigade commanders to withdraw, “My God, we must get out of this!” he cried.[100] Sedgwick’s division broke, in near route, the men running for their lives back toward the protection of the Poffenberger ridge.  Sumner watched in horror and disbelief as he lost nearly 2,500 men in twenty minutes.  This debacle has come to be known as the “disaster in the West Woods.” The fight was over for Sedgwick’s division but the peripatetic French was yet to make his contribution in another quarter of the field.   The body of troops that had attracted French’s attention was that of Greene, who now with ammunition replenished was ready to resume his advance and again terrain would have a telling effect upon the proceedings, this time to the woe of the Confederates.[101]

The Mumma swale

          Greene ordered his division into line of battle, still sheltered in the swale – ready for action but concealed from view of anyone approaching from their front.  Emerging from the West woods, elements of McLaws Division including Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw’s brigade entered the open ground at the Dunker Church and surveyed the landscape before them.  In the distance they saw the exposed flank of French’s division – a ripe plum ready for the plucking – what they did not see however was Greene’s division mere yards in front of them though totally concealed within the swale.  At Greene’s order the division rose up delivering a devastating volley of fire into the Confederate front, shattering them entirely and forcing them to hastily withdraw back to the sheltering trees and ledges of the West Woods.  Greene had achieved a great battlefield triumph by use of unexpectedly beneficent terrain rather than by design.[102]

          Greene, flushed with success and still believing that Sedgwick was on his right (though by this time Sedgwick had retreated to the North, a retreat that was out of Greene’s line of vision) led his men into the West Woods around Dunker Church.  Greene, unsupported, held that position until 1:00 p.m. when, his men fatigued, low on ammunition and without support to their right were forced by bolstered Confederates into a fighting retreat back toward the East Woods.  Although Greene’s men performed in a manner for which he could be justly proud, in the end his leadership and the courage and steadfastness of his men had to give way to circumstance.[103]

The Sunken Road

          Although French was initially moving to the support of Greene, thinking he was Sedgwick, before he was able to link up and realize his mistake he found himself engaged on his front by Confederates at the Roulette farm just north of “hog-trough road” - a sunken road that has come down in history as the “Bloody Lane.”  French was facing Confederate pickets of Maj. Gen Daniel Harvey Hill, who had established his position in that sunken road.  At the time French made contact, the last of Sumner’s troops - the first division under Richardson - was just crossing Antietam Creek and still an hour behind French.[104]

          French’s pickets drove in those of Hill and found that the main body of Confederates had established themselves in the sunken road.  Although by no means trench-like, the road was much depressed with high banks affording great protection to those emplaced Confederates.  The worm rail fence in front of the Rebels had been bolstered with additional rails to make it a strong breastwork for men to take cover behind and to brace their rifles upon.  It was a prepared position and one of great strength against a frontal attack.[105]

          Lying between French and D.H. Hill was a high ridge to the north of, and running parallel to, the sunken road.  That ridge, as the Union advance was mounted, would be of great advantage to the nearly entrenched Confederates below. [106]

          Of particular note is the composition of French’s division: it was operating under a significant handicap.  Many of French’s regiments were formed a scant month earlier.  Indeed fifteen per cent of McClellan’s entire army was comprised of brand-new recruits, men with no combat experience, and that lack of experience was about to have a devastating effect upon those green troops[107].  The Confederates who awaited those rookies were, to a man, seasoned combat veterans, the “hard core” of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Now they waited, rifles bristling along the fence line under instructions to hold their fire until given the order to shoot.  These were disciplined soldiers who followed orders and who knew what they were tasked with doing.[108]

          To the north of the ridge French arrayed his division into three wide lines of battle, each line fifty yards behind the one in front of it, and one at a time those lines marched up to the crest of the ridge to engage the enemy below.  The Confederates, with bated breath waited.  The first indication they had of the approaching Federal line was the tips of their flagstaffs, and as the Federals continued their ascent their banners came into view followed by their heads and then their heads and shoulders.  Still the Confederates held their fire.  They waited until the long blue line reached the very crest of the ridge where they were silhouetted against the morning sky like targets in a shooting gallery.[109]  Confederate Col. John B. Gordon, in the sunken road recalled; “Not a shot would be fired until my voice should be heard commanding ‘Fire!’”[110] Gordon’s command was answered with a will.  In one titanic flash of smoke, fire, and lead that first Union line of battle was shattered, men falling dead or wounded in the hundreds.  The inexperience of the men in that first line was evident in the staggering number of casualties they sustained in but a moment.[111] 

          Fifty yards behind that first line of battle advanced the second.  Like those who went before them they were brand new troops; like those who went before them they advanced to the crest of the ridge, and like those who went before them as they gained the crest they were shot down in the hundreds. As the smoke cleared the Confederates saw the fruit of their labors and the advantage which terrain had provided them.[112]

          Despite the carnage before them, on came the third Union line of battle.  Like those who had gone before them they advanced toward the crest of the ridge; wounded men from those previous assaults tugged at the pantlegs of the men advancing, hoping to deter them from disaster, but – unlike those who had gone before them – the men of the third line were combat veterans, they had been in the war for a year or more and knew their craft well.  French’s third line did advance up toward the crest of the ridge but only so far so that their eyes and the muzzles of their rifles were visible to the Confederates below.  The Federals were using the crest of the ridge itself as a bulwark and suddenly the terrain was working well to their advantage.  This time when the smoke cleared the sunken road had earned its new name as the “Bloody Lane” as it slowly began to fill with Confederate dead and wounded.[113]

          Both sides were holding their own, the combat surging back and forth, Federals rushing the lane and Rebels driving them back.  French’s line was much depleted and the opposing sides were nearly evenly matched when the balance abruptly shifted in the favor of the Federals.  Richardson had entered the field. With the arrival of Richardson the Federal line extended, left and right, beyond that of the Confederates.  Richardson, like French before him, committed his division in a piecemeal fashion with little advantage gained until finally terrain again intervened to the benefit of the Federals.[114]

          To the eastern end of the ridge on the Confederate right the ridge formed a dogleg.  At this point the ridge ran perpendicular to the Confederate line.  It was at that point in the line where Federals, under the command of Col. Francis C. Barlow mounted the ridge and were presented with the vista of the Confederate flank.  Suddenly and without foreknowledge by Barlow the vulnerability of the terrain of the Rebel line was revealed.  That position, which was proof against a frontal attack, was entirely vulnerable to one coming from the flank.  Barlow quickly acted upon the advantage, delivering a devastating fire down the length of the Confederate line.  One can only imagine the chaos and confusion.  In that confusion the Confederate line crumbled, rebels running for their lives back toward Sharpsburg, jubilant but now exhausted Yankees tumbling into the sunken road.  They had just broken a hole in the center of Lee’s line.  A golden door of opportunity opened for George B. McClellan: a bold thrust now could throw back Lee’s line to the Potomac forcing him to surrender or be destroyed.  Boldness, however was not in the nature of McClellan, who settled for what he had gained.  The Federals who had taken the lane were exhausted, out of ammunition, and with the loss of the mortally wounded Richardson, without bold leadership.  The best they could do was reform their lines in a defensive posture.  That golden door of opportunity had slammed shut and the battle north of Sharpsburg had essentially drawn to a close.  The carnage would continue, however, on the southern end of the field.[115]

          In almost no instance in the morning’s fighting had opposing commanders possessed a good grasp of the terrain that lay before them and time and time again that terrain interposed itself upon command decision making.  McLaws and Barksdale, not by design but forced by terrain, arrived in the decisive position to shatter Sedgwick.  Greene, forced to take cover in a swale to await ammunition, found himself in a perfect offensive position from which to break a Confederate advance.  Barlow, not knowing exactly what was before him emerged upon the flank of his enemy through an irregularity of terrain.  In each phase of the fighting whether in the ravines of the West Woods, the Mumma swale, or the ridge before the Sunken Road commanders followed the dictates of terrain rather than following an overall tactical plan.  Such was the nature of the field at Antietam.

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                Chapter III

                        The Terrain of Antietam: The Battle South of Sharpsburg

          McClellan is justifiably criticized for deploying his army in a “piece-meal” fashion, and as has been seen, that was also the manner in which his corps and divisional commanders had comported themselves.  At no point thus far in the battle had a concerted and coordinated effort been made to break the Confederate line.  In each phase of the battle, corps were deployed one division at a time; frequently divisions were deployed one brigade at a time, similarly brigades, as at the Sunken Road, went into battle a regiment at a time.  Perhaps McClellan was setting the tone for his subordinates to follow, nonetheless there was blame to be shared by all.  A better, if still flawed, Federal effort occurred on the southern end of the field as the IX Corps under Burnside and Cox made its contribution to the battle.  But despite the best efforts of those Federal commanders, the concept of “command and control” was to be nearly entirely subjugated to the extremes of the terrain on the southern end of the field.

Lower Bridge

          Traditionally the battle is interpreted in three distinct phases; the Cornfield phase of the early morning, the Sunken Road phase of mid morning, and the Lower, or Burnside, Bridge phase of late morning.  Writer Shelby Foote has popularized the fight as “three battles piled one on top of the other.” In actuality at 10:00 a.m. the entire field was in action with the West Woods fight in crescendo, the Sunken Road fully engaged, and the struggle at Lower bridge in its opening moments.  It is the action at Lower, or Burnside, Bridge which commands much attention and sparks the imagination of most visitors to Antietam National Battlefield.[116]

          One of 34 such bridges in Washington County, Lower Bridge is a beautiful multi-arched stone structure spanning the Antietam.  Built in the decades between 1820 and 1840 the bridges were constructed to withstand the test of time.  All but three of those durable bridges are still open to vehicular traffic.  Perhaps because of its picturesque nature and dramatic setting Lower Bridge has become the icon of the Antietam Battlefield, and a focal point of visitor attention.  There was dramatic combat at the bridge to be sure, but what is frequently overlooked is the greater bulk of the fighting that ensued after the bridge was crossed, fighting - as shall be revealed, which determined the outcome of the battle. 

          The crossing of the Antietam Creek south of Sharpsburg became, with the blunting of Federal efforts on the northern end of the field, the greatest hope of victory for McClellan.  To force the creek would be to get to Sharpsburg, to get to Sharpsburg would be to cut Lee’s army in half and cut Lee’s army off from its escape route.  It would be up to the IX Corps to achieve this goal and attain the sought-after victory.[117]

          Command of the IX Corps was in an ambiguous state.  At the outset of the campaign, and for the sake of efficient maneuvering over great distances, McClellan divided the Army of the Potomac into “wings,” each wing comprised of two or more corps and under the leadership of one of his lieutenants.  Burnside commanded the right wing comprised of Hooker’s I Corps and of his own IX Corps, now under Jacob Cox.  This wing command structure was put into place prior to the army leaving Washington DC and remained in effect through the September 14^th Battle of South Mountain.  Following that fight however, McClellan detached Hooker’s corps into an independent command, leaving Burnside in command of his IX corps though still under the belief that the wing structure was still in effect.  Burnside interpreted the detachment of Hooker’s corps as a slight from McClellan and responded in a state of pique for the days following South Mountain including the battle at Antietam Creek.[118]

          Though McClellan had effectively abolished the now obsolete wings of the army, Burnside clung to the concept and kept Cox in command of the IX Corps and insisted that Hooker was only “temporarily detached by the general commanding.” [119]  This clumsy arrangement put Cox in a difficult position.  Orders from McClellan were directed to Burnside with the expectation that Burnside would carry them out, however Burnside, still insistent upon his position of wing commander, passed those orders on to Cox.[120]  Such a faulty and artificial arrangement provided for opportunities of miscommunication and may have caused delays in executing orders at crucial moments in the battle.[121]

          Compounding Burnside’s embarrassment was McClellan’s plan - a plan that was ambiguous at best: “The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy’s left – at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack. With the hope of something more by assailing the enemy’s right – and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful. To attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand.” [122]  The ambiguity of the wording will greatly impact the efforts of Burnside/Cox in the final hours of the battle.[123]

          Burnside’s sector of the field was the terrain south of Sharpsburg on the eastern side of Antietam Creek facing Lee’s right.  The terrain on the southern end of the field is distinctly different from that of the northern end.  The northern end, as has been discussed, is characterized by rolling terrain, striped with rock outcroppings, hills and swales, wood lots and ravines; the terrain although deceptive in nature is not extreme.  The southern end of the field however is of a very different complexion.  Very steep banks towering two hundred feet above the creek contain Antietam Creek to the south of Sharpsburg.  The folds of ground provide deep ravines and blind spots.  The expanse of ground between Lower Bridge and Sharpsburg is of steadily increasing elevation making it an all-uphill advance toward Sharpsburg over very broken, confusing, and ultimately deadly terrain.

          As is the case with much of the battlefield the terrain at Lower, or Rohrbach Bridge, now known as Burnside Bridge, is little changed from its 1862 appearance.  Antietam Creek in the area of the bridge flows from the north making a severe loop below the bridge and then flows southward before turning west and on to the Potomac River four miles distant.  The banks of the creek at the bridge are today much as they were at the time of the battle and are not sloped to meet the water but drop off at nearly right angles to the water.  The creek-bed at the bridge is a mix of rocks and silt, the rocks being particularly slippery.  The depth of the creek depends upon the time of year and the amount of rainfall or snowmelt.  Most accounts agree that at the time of the battle the water was waist-deep.[124]

          The bridge carries the Sharpsburg-Rohersville Road that runs from the northwest to the southeast.  Upon crossing the bridge the road lies nearly east - west in alignment.  The bridge is one hundred seventy five feet in length and twelve feet wide; a width that accommodated a horse-drawn wagon or a marching body of men on a four man front, the standard deployment for men of the march.  Each end of the bridge contains a fan-shaped apron to accommodate the turn required by the extreme angle of the road as it crosses the bridge.  The road continues to the south of the bridge where it runs parallel to the creek for a distance of 300 yards.  Towering above, and parallel to, the road is today’s “Georgian’s overlook,” a hike stop designated by the Park Service as one of the key positions of the Confederate line with a commanding view of that road [attachment D].

          Defending the bridge were approximately 400 Confederates commanded by General Robert Toombs comprised of the 2^nd and 20^th Georgia regiments. The Georgians arrived on the western side of the creek on September 15^th and had the luxury of time in which to prepare their positions.[125]  Digging rifle pits, bolstering fences, and piling rocks the men worked with a will.  Although their numbers were few they determined to exploit to the fullest the terrain of their position.  They removed brush from both sides of the creek and felled selected trees to establish clear fields of fire.  The natural strongpoint of an abandoned rock quarry was fortified as a citadel against attack.  The quarry remains today, one hundred feet above the bridge, about five feet in depth and large enough to accommodate a company of men.   Far to the rear of the Georgians were the Rebel batteries on Cemetery Hill that had pre-sighted their guns upon the Federal side of the bridge.  Despite being few in number the Confederates could not have wished for better terrain.[126]

           The Confederate positions were on heights that towered 130 feet above the Creek; the eastern side of the creek, which became the Federal side, was of a different complexion entirely.  Although there is high ground on the eastern side it is set back from the creek by two hundred yards.  A broad, flat floodplain is the major characteristic of the eastern side of the creek; beyond the plain is a ridge nearly as high as that on the western side though not advantageous for the placement of artillery.  Jacob Cox writes: The “depth of the valley and its course made it impossible to reach the enemy’s position at the bridge by artillery fire from the hill-tops on our side.  Not so from the enemy’s position, for the curve of the valley was such that it was perfectly enfiladed near the bridge by the Confederate batteries.” The terrain presented all advantage to the Confederates and all disadvantage to the Federals.  Perhaps nowhere on the battlefield was the terrain such a dominant element and used to greater advantage. [127]

          Though Toombs held, and fortified, an easily defensible position, his manpower was extremely limited.  Upon the shoulders of his four hundred rebels rested the responsibility of denying the bridge to the 12,000-man IX Corps.  Toombs deployed his troops to best advantage placing the bulk of his men to the south of the bridge, the heights of which enfiladed the approach road to the bridge.  Any Federal advancing up that road toward the bridge would be running a 300-yard gauntlet of accurate and destructive Confederate fire.[128]  Toomb’s men, in prepared, nearly impregnable, positions awaited the arrival of the IX Corps.[129]

          The IX Corps was a veteran organization, tasting victory only days before on South Mountain.  Led by the popular and charismatic Ambrose Burnside the IX Corps was well disciplined and enjoyed very high morale.  As already discussed the leadership of the Corps was somewhat clumsy with responsibility resting somewhere between Burnside and Cox.  Furthermore the IX Corps may have been operating under a misapprehension of McClellan’s wishes.  Cox maintained in the years following the war that the efforts of the IX Corps were that of merely a diversion in force drawing, Confederate assets from the northern end of the field from which quarter McClellan expected victory. [130]

          Burnside arrived on the late afternoon of the 16^th and took up his positions on the east side of the creek.  McClellan made one of his rare visits to what would be the front that evening to supervise the placement of Burnside’s assets.[131]  Curious is the fact that Burnside, with the luxury of time, did not undertake any reconnaissance of his position or of any alternate creek crossing points.  This lapse would come back to haunt him the following day.

          On the morning of the 17^th Burnside received his orders to begin his assault.  The exact time of the receipt of those orders remains an enduring controversy.  McClellan in the months following his inconclusive fight of the 17^th insisted that his order to attack was received by Burnside at 8:00 a.m. but that Burnside did not launch that attack until two hours later.  Cox, following the war, remained adamant that that order was not received until after 9:00 a.m. and the attack was then launched in a timely manner.  Again Cox accounts for this disparity in opinion as an effort by McClellan to shift as much blame as possible for the outcome of the battle in his run for the presidency.  Whether or not that is the case, Cox makes both a compelling and quite convincing case for his version of affairs. [132]

          On the morning of the attack Burnside advanced elements of three of his divisions under Brig. Gen. James Nagle, Col. Edward Ferrero, and Col. George Crook to the vicinity of the bridge.  Brig. Gen Isaac P. Rodman’s division was positioned to the south of the bridge.   Shortly after 9:00 a.m. two companies, A and B, of the 11^th Connecticut opened the attack.  Their orders were to brush the Confederate pickets from the eastern side of the bridge, clearing the way for a comprehensive assault.  The two companies formed behind twin knolls on the Federal side of the creek opposite the bridge.  An orderly charge began with the men from Connecticut charging down the steep western slopes of the knolls and deploying on the floodplain below.  Then the Confederates opened fire.  Upon open ground and without cover of any sort the two Connecticut companies were overwhelmed in a thunderclap of Confederate fire.  The terrain of the avenue of approach from the two knolls had funneled the men of Connecticut directly into the line of fire from the Confederates.  Because of the alignment of the bridge within a crescent of high ground on the Confederate side the Federals were subjected to a killing fire from left, right, and center.  Utterly shattered, the Federals were forced to retire leaving the ground littered with their dead and wounded.  A dismal pattern had been established for the efforts of the IX Corps on that deadly morning.[133]

          Burnside, through Cox, devised the next plan that would entail a closely coordinated effort between the Divisions of Crook and Rodman.  Crook was to advance from the northwest to the bridge while Rodman crossed the creek below the bridge to assault the flank of Toombs’ Confederates.  The plan, so clear in the mind, proved complex upon the terrain.[134]

          On the afternoon of the sixteenth McClellan, during his supervisory visit to Burnside’s position, informed him as to his wishes for the disposition of his forces; McClellan also ordered a reconnaissance by engineers downstream with the mission of finding a ford or other suitable crossing point.  The engineers proceed along the banks of the creek and within one-third of a mile below the bridge found a ford that they deemed serviceable.  They looked no further downstream and instead returned and reported their findings to Burnside.  [135]

          The second assault upon the bridge was made by the entire 11^th Connecticut commanded by Col. Henry Walter Kingsbury.  The Connecticut regiment advanced over the knolls and upon the floodplain to distract the Confederates from the twin flank attacks by Crook and Rodman.  The coordination of timing was critical.  For the strategy to be successful there had to be a clear understanding among all parties of their various roles in the effort and there needed to be good communications between each element of the attack, and it was also essential that each element knew exactly where it was going.  Given the lack of instantaneous communications of any sort coupled with the rugged and bewildering terrain of the area the flaws of the plan soon became apparent.[136]

          Visitors to Antietam National Battlefield, when surveying the bridge from the Confederate high ground often ask why the Federals, with their overwhelming numbers, didn’t simply mass their forces in a concerted attack upon the bridge?  With the panoramic view from the Confederate side this is a logical question.  Frequently a Park Ranger will take those visitors to the Federal side of the bridge and their question will be repeated back to them.  The reasons the terrain worked against a massed attack come into stark focus.  From the eastern, or Federal side of the bridge, the view is of a towering citadel that could only be approached over a broad expanse of open ground.  Following that advance the creek would have to be crossed by the narrow bridge or by fording the creek with its uneven and slippery creek bed and harshly steep banks, then only to be confronted with a nearly vertical 130-foot bluff upon which Confederates with accurate rifles, backed by artillery, were entrenched.  In McClellan’s official report he acknowledged that it would be “a difficult task.”  The terrain was solely to the advantage of the defenders; this was the challenge that lay before the 11^th Connecticut.[137]

          Kingsbury formed his lines of battle behind the protection of the twin knolls and began his advance to the floodplain below.  Predictably, as the Federal lines gained the flat, open ground the Confederates opened fire with devastating results.  Federal losses in the initial volley were great and the attack began to stall.  Kingsbury, in an effort to restore the forward momentum plunged into the creek at the head of a small band of stalwarts.  Kingsbury may have expected the bulk of the 11^th Connecticut to follow him, but by that time they had gone to ground desperately seeking cover behind a stone wall and the meager protection of a post and rail fence.  The men of Connecticut were pinned down on the deadly terrain of open ground.  Kingsbury, gamely leading a small group toward the Confederate side of the creek, was struck by multiple bullets and was carried from the creek, under fire, only to expire form his wounds.  The diversionary attack by the 11^th Connecticut was no more successful that the abortive attack that had preceded it, one hundred thirty nine  men, one-third, of the 11^th Connecticut, were killed or wounded.  The regiment was shattered; meanwhile Crook and Rodman had yet to be heard from.[138]

          The plan called for Crook’s brigade of 1,800 men to march to their jumping off point to the northeast of the bridge and, covered by the diversion of the 11^th Connecticut, to storm the bridge in a concerted effort.  Crook’s regiments were operating in unfamiliar territory and became disoriented in the scrubby woodland behind the twin knolls through which they proceeded. They were lost and moving 500 yards north of the bridge and far beyond their planned assembly point.  Emerging from the brush Crook realized he was out of position but improvised a new plan based upon the emerging situation.  By assaulting the bridge from the northeast he may have been able to take the Confederates unawares coming from such an unexpected angle as he was.  Ironically, had Crook had better information and had the area been better reconnoitered, he would have found a suitable ford only a short distance further north.  Had he found and exploited this crossing he would have emerged in a position on the flank of Toombs and squarely between Toombs and the only lightly defended heights outside of Sharpsburg - Lee’s weakest position.  In ignorance of the opportunity Crook attacked from the northeast.[139]

          As Crook launched his attack Rodman, to the south, had found his designated crossing point.  As the engineers had reported, the creek was shallow and easily fordable, however what the engineers failed to appreciate was the steepness of the bluff the Federals would face upon crossing.  Upon that bluff were dug-in Confederates who opened a blistering fire on the Federals of Rodman’s division who attempted a crossing.  Seeing the fruitlessness of the attempt Rodman, at the head of his column, proceeded further downstream into the great unknown looking for a more suitable crossing point.  Thus the plan continued to unravel.[140]

          As Crook’s leading regiment - the 28^th Ohio charged toward the bridge, the 20^th Georgia opened fire. Immediately the Ohioans felt the brunt of the Confederate volley.  Subsequent Union regiments of Crook’s brigade shifted more to the east seeking cover in the brush line, receiving some covering fire from the remnants of the 11^th Connecticut still sheltering behind the stone wall and post and rail fence.  Aware that Rodman was still absent from the scene Crook called off the failed assault and removed his men to a less exposed position.  Crook mishandled his brigade and the third Federal attack ended, as did those that preceded it, in failure.  Federal casualties were mounting and the Confederates still held superior terrain of the high ground and controlled the bridge.[141]

          For as much success as the Confederates were having at stymieing the Federal efforts, they were, themselves, suffering casualties from accurate rifle fire as well as from Union artillery now deployed to advantage on the high ground far east of the creek.  The Confederates after fending off three Union attacks were running low on ammunition and none was forthcoming.  Despite the crucial position of Toombs he was out on a limb, totally unsupported.  There were no reinforcements available nor any replenishment of his dwindling ammunition.  An equation of inevitability calculated into the Confederate defensive effort.[142]

          The forth attempt to storm the bridge was the effort of General Samuel Sturgis’ division.  Burnside at this juncture taking a direct role in the management of the IX Corps exhibited a confounding inability to learn from the failures of the previous assaults.  Burnside ordered Sturgis to lead his division, in columns of fours as though on the march, to proceed at the double quick up the Rohersville road toward the bridge and to take it at the point of the bayonet. The time was about 10:30.[143]

          Sturgis personally supervised the attack, which proved as doomed as the earlier attempts.  By advancing up the Rohersville road Sturgis’ division was exposed to a flanking fire for the entire 300 yard length of the road that ran parallel to the Confederate positions on the ground above.  Sturgis’ men were quite like targets in a shooting gallery and the Georgians took full advantage which the superior terrain afforded them.  [144]

          As Sturgis’ regiments advanced along the road other Union forces on the high ground of the east side of the creek poured supporting fire into the Confederate positions on the west.  Under a withering enfilade fire the Federals ran the gauntlet, there were still 200 yards to the bridge and the Union assault was melting away like candle wax.  Federals, returning fire, found the Confederates nearly invisible in their concealed positions and masked by battle smoke.  But the Confederates too were taking losses.  Union artillery had found the range of the Rebel positions and the Georgians were suffering mounting casualties as their ammunition continued to dwindle.  As Sturgis ordered the withdrawal of his battered regiments the struggle entered its fourth hour with no gains made.  Sturgis, however, was not finished.[145]

          Coincident with Sturgis’ attack was Rodman still seeking a crossing place.  Much time had elapsed.  Rodman, it can be assumed, heard the firing at the bridge and must have known that the delicate timetable of the double envelopment had elapsed, but he was committed to make his contribution to the fight. As he proceeded downstream the Confederate fire from above began to lessen as he overran the extreme right end of the thin Rebel line.  He had led his 3,200 - man column nearly a mile downstream.  Although he was no longer under fire he was thwarted by the terrain.  The creek was still too high and the bluffs on the western bank were far too steep to affect a crossing.  He continued his southward march in hopes of finding a better crossing point.[146]

          Previously Sturgis advanced only half of his division in that ill-fated advance up the Rohersville Road toward the bridge.  He was now ready to commit the remainder of his force based upon lessons learned.  Burnside issued an unequivocal order to Sturgis to “carry the bridge at all hazards.” Sturgis selected two regiments – the 51^st New York and the 51^st Pennsylvania to make the assault.[147]

          Unlike the obvious and deadly approach taken by the regiments of his earlier attack Sturgis determined to use the terrain to his advantage.  He formed up the two fifty-firsts on the far side of the twin knolls on the Federal side of the creek.  Sturgis formed his line of battle with the 51^st Pennsylvania on the right and the New Yorkers on the left.  At about 12:30 p.m. the order to charge rang out and the men of New York and Pennsylvania emerged from the tree line at the crest of the knolls and began a pell-mell charge forward with bayonets fixed.  Developing momentum as they raced downhill they crossed the two-hundred yard flood plain quickly.  As they approached the bridge their advance was broken, not by Confederate fire but by the rock wall and post and rail fence that remnants of the 11^th Connecticut were still sheltering behind.  Without breaking stride the men of the 51^st Pennsylvania quickly deployed behind the stone wall and established a firing line.  The men from the Empire State did the same from the position of the less protective post and rail fence.  Both regiments delivered volleys of fire into the still largely unseen Confederates, lost in the smoke and rifle pits on the bluff before them.[148]

          Shortly before one o’clock an already dynamic situation became even more so.  As the two Fifty-Firsts engaged the Confederates head-on, a single Federal regiment upstream was tilting the balance.  Five companies of the 28^th Ohio under Crook were forcing a crossing of the Creek to the north.  Simultaneously to the South, Rodman, who had finally found a suitable crossing point, was approaching the Confederate right flank.  The rebels saw the mounting threat to left right and center.  Nearly out of ammunition and with casualties mounting the Confederate fire began to slacken and that was the moment that the men from New York and Pennsylvania made their boldly decisive move.[149]  In what was essentially a spontaneous movement the two Federal regiments formed up in rough columns and rushed the bridge, the flags of both regiments crossing side-by-side.  The Confederates, after firing off desperate final rounds saw the handwriting upon the wall.  The men from New York and Pennsylvania, now across the bridge, were racing up the road from the bridge toward the Confederates.  The 28^th Ohio had crossed upstream and the lead regiments of Rodman’s division were closing in on the Confederate right.  The rebel position became untenable and Toombs’s men, after a gallant four-hour defense were forced back into a fighting withdrawal. “The stars and stripes” reported Sturgis “were planted on the opposite bank at 1:00 p.m.” The struggle was over and the Lower Bridge had earned its new name as Burnside Bridge. The losses, compared to other areas of the field that day were light.  Casualties among the Federals were about 500 killed or wounded, the Georgians suffered about 120 to the same fates.  The number of casualties certainly did not match the effort and drama expended that midmorning, though for the Confederates those were irreplaceable losses. For as much time, blood, and ammunition was spent forcing the bridge, for Burnside and the men of the IX Corps, the really hard part was about to begin. [150]

Middle Bridge

          Often overlooked in the narrative of the battle is the action in McClellan’s center where troops in Porter’s V Corps and Pleasonton’s cavalry were deployed as McClellan’s reserve and the force blocking the road to Washington DC, Baltimore, and points north.  The historic Middle Bridge has been lost to progress, being replaced by a more modern highway bridge in the 1930s; however when one stands at the bridge today the tactical and strategic importance of its position becomes apparent.

           Middle Bridge spanned the Antietam Creek one mile to the east of Sharpsburg.  The bridge is flanked to the north by a ridge of very high ground upon which Pleasonton posted batteries of horse artillery to engage Confederate batteries on Cemetery Hill slightly less than a mile to the west.  So important was the position that Pleasonton maintained it throughout the 16^th and 17^th with artillery deployed on the high ground facing Sharpsburg. The area surrounding Middle Bridge was some of the most advantageous terrain held by the Federals.[151]

           Middle Bridge was the Position of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s 13,000-man strong V Corps. Forty heavy, long-range 20-pounder parrott rifles were positioned on the high ground east of Antietam Creek on the highest point of the entire Union front.  The range of the parrott rifles was in excess of two and a half miles, reaching well beyond the Dunker Church plateau. In addition to the heavy guns were Pleasonton’s horse-artillery batteries mounting three inch ordnance rifles and ten - pounder parrotts with ranges up to one and one half miles. Supporting the substantial number of guns were five regiments of well-disciplined and proficient U.S. regulars commanded by Brig. Gen. George Sykes. The strong center of McClellan’s line was well anchored and more than adequately supported; that being said, McClellan never viewed the powerful V Corps in anything more than a defensive role.  McClellan’s reluctance to use Porter’s Federals in a more aggressive posture would cost him a great opportunity. [152]

          McClellan, in reflecting upon the battle two years later, reveals his hesitancy in using the V Corps as an offensive asset.  Regarding the Middle Bridge position McClellan wrote in 1864 “it was necessary to watch this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here, to push upon us a vigorous assault for the purpose of piercing our center and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains.”  McClellan’s reasoning is sound based upon his misapprehension of the size of Lee’s army.  One of the great tragedies of the star-crossed McClellan was that he put such a great premium on his anxieties and less upon the mettle of his army.[153]

          At 2:00 p.m., shortly after Burnside had forced Lower Bridge and began assembling and sorting out his divisions on the newly-gained west side of Antietam Creek, Pleasonton began deploying troops and guns over Middle Bridge in line of battle to extend to what would be Burnside’s right flank. [154]  From the high ground he possessed, Pleasonton could see Burnside’s developing line and was eager to give him support.  The regulars fanning out on the terrain west of Middle Bridge possessed the potential to add enormous strength to the developing IX Corps line.[155]

The Union final attack

          In the interval between 1:30 and 3:30 Burnside assessed the developing situation and pressed three of his four divisions to the western side of Antietam Creek.  This was a laborious and time-consuming process.  It is widely believed that Burnside dawdled in these crucial moments and that had he moved with greater alacrity the day’s outcome may have been very different.  Cox however is clear in his feelings on this issue noting that ammunition was exhausted as were the men of Sturgis’ division who reported his men nearly unfit for further service.  Guns and ammunition were sent for, all having to cross the narrow bridge as the fords did not accommodate wagons or limbers. As to the amount of time this process takes, Cox, somewhat in defense of Burnside wrote “As a mode of ready reckoning, it is usual to assume that a division requires an hour to march past a given point by the flank.  With the crossing of an ammunition train, the interval of time is more than accounted for.”  Burnside had to move three divisions, two of which were fatigued, and supporting artillery, past the given point of the bridge, and managed to do it in three hours, by Cox’s reckoning Burnside achieved this task in the requisite time period.[156]

          Burnside, upon his namesake bridge, personally hastened his men across and took a more active role in the proceedings.  The divisions of Crook, Rodman, and Brig. Gen Orlando B. Wilcox were marshalled into position for the final attack with the exhausted men of Sturgis’ Division held in reserve.  Rodman’s division comprised the left of the line, Willcox the right, and Crook in support.  The difficult task of forming a cohesive line of battle was exacerbated by the broken and rolling terrain. It was at this juncture Pleasonton’s plan of linking Sykes’ regulars to Burnside’s right was initiated. The Union line of battle was an unbroken line of men nearly a mile wide.[157]

          The terrain facing the men of the IX Corps was daunting.  They would be advancing three quarters of a mile, all uphill, and all the while being exposed to over 40 pieces of pre-sighted Confederate artillery.  Ezra Carman describes this terrain thus: “The plateau along which runs the road to Harper’s Ferry is 40 to 70 feet higher than the ridge upon and behind which the Ninth Corps deployed, completely commands it, as is favorable to the movement of artillery,  From this road to the Antietam were the bridge crosses is 1360 yards”.  The terrain fully favored the Confederates and especially Confederate artillery.[158]

           At 3:45 the order was given to advance and that long, confident line of Union blue and steel stepped off the mark, all eyes on the bristling guns on the high ground before them. Some 8,000 men of the IX Corps were under fire from the moment they began the advance.  Divisional commander Willcox reported that the “whole plateau was swept by cross-fire of artillery.”  One can only imagine that after a day of exertion the men of the IX Corps greatly wished to catch their breath and find some cover from Confederate fire, but the one thing Burnside could not afford to lose was his forward momentum.  Divisional, brigade, and regimental commanders exhorted their men forward over the killing terrain toward the Confederate guns and, though unbeknownst to the Federals, a perilously thin line of Confederate defenders: the 2,800 man division of Confederate General David R. Jones. Burnside’s opportunity to crush Lee’s left flank and cut him off from his escape route was at hand. Victory was within his grasp.[159]

          Despite being few in number the Confederates were on favorable terrain.  Sheltering behind stone walls on high ridges Rebel riflemen gave up ground grudgingly to the advancing Federals.  Shells shrieked over the heads of soldiers as artillery batteries dueled with one another.  Infantrymen on both sides fell victim to the shot, shell, and canister of the guns. Of one particular instance of Confederate artillery firing upon Federal infantry D.H. Hill remarked “The firing was beautiful, [it was] the only instance I have ever known of infantry being broken by artillery fire at long range.”[160]

          It was a struggle for the Federals to keep their lines dressed over the rugged terrain of their advance.  Ravines and steep inclines played havoc with the alignment of regiments one to the other.  But the Union forces struggled onward, dislodging Confederates from behind stone walls and fences, forcing them to fall back only to find cover in secondary positions. Casualties were mounting on both sides.[161]

         The Confederates gave ground grudgingly. The 9^th New York captured and temporarily held a Rebel battery. Confederates were driven to the very outskirts of Sharpsburg and the Federals could see the steeple of the Lutheran church on the main street. Burnside’s far right division, linked with the regulars extending from Middle Bridge were in the outer streets of Sharpsburg. Victory for the men of the IX Corps was just over the next ridge.  The Federals, electrified with certain victory, battled forward unaware that their fortunes were about to turn.[162]

          Near the far left flank of Burnside’s long line marched the 16^th Connecticut regiment of volunteers.  Like a high percentage of McClellan’s army these men had been in uniform for a scant three weeks and had only learned to load their rifles two days earlier.  They were little more than civilians in uniform, nonetheless they were deployed in a very vulnerable position. [163] They advanced through a very deep ravine between two hills planted with corn, the terrain made it impossible to detect whom was to their right and left and also left them in ignorance of what lay to their front.  They separated from the regiment on their right causing, unknown to them, a widening gap in the line. Their vulnerability soon became apparent in a most sanguinary manner.[164]

 The arrival of A.P. Hill 

       Confederate General A.P. Hill with his division of 4,000 men had been left behind in Harpers Ferry after the fall of that town to marshal captured ordnance stores and other Union supplies.  He also was charged with the task of paroling some 13,000 Federal soldiers.  Early on the morning of the 17^th Lee dispatched a messenger to Hill ordering him to come as quickly as possible to Sharpsburg.  Hill’s division represented the last of the Army of Northern Virginia troops available to participate in the fight at Antietam Creek.  Harpers Ferry is a seventeen mile march from Sharpsburg, and Hill got his men moving shortly after he received Lee’s order and arrived on the field seven hours after leaving Harpers Ferry.[165]

          In the grueling seventeen mile forced march Hill lost nearly a quarter of his force to exhaustion; nonetheless at around 4:30 he appeared on the left flank of the IX Corps with 3,000 men whom he immediately pushed into action.  Hill’s veterans represented the cream of Lee’s army and they proved themselves in the events of the following twenty minutes.[166]

          Hill’s approach was observed by Federals on Burnside’s left, however some confusion may have influenced their reaction time as many of the Rebels in the leading column were wearing Federal blue uniforms, having discarded their vermin-ridden rags in Harpers Ferry substituting them with the booty of captured Federal uniforms.  The Federals of Col. Eliakim P. Scammon’s Division, on the left, assumed that Hill’s lead Confederates were comrades.  The delay in recognizing the foe was fatal to the Federal effort on the left.[167]

          Hill’s six brigades smashed into Burnside’s left.  The 16^th Connecticut, in their first engagement was overwhelmed by the sudden onslaught. Historian Stephen Sears quotes Lieutenant B.G. Blakeslee thus: “In a moment we were riddled with shot…orders were given which were not understood.  Neither the line-officers nor the men had any knowledge of regimental movements.” The new recruits managed one volley and then, with their colors, fled like sheep.[168] The shattering of the 16^th Connecticut caused a chain reaction of confusion on the left as Hill began rolling up the Federal line.  Finally the Confederate advance was blunted and stalled as Hill’s troops came up against veteran Federal regiments who held the line.  Despite the efforts of the veterans the Federal position had become untenable.  Exhausted from their arduous advance, depleted of ammunition and mauled on their left, the IX Corps made a fighting withdrawal to the ridge above Antietam Creek, under the protection of their guns, back nearly from whence they had begun.  Hill’s veterans, who were tired when they arrived, who were exhausted now, had pushed the IX Corps back nearly to where they had started from.[169]

          Despite Hill’s magnificent performance, by five o’clock in the afternoon Lee found himself at his most vulnerable yet.  Lee had no more reinforcements - all of his men had been engaged the battle.  They were battered, bloodied, low on ammunition, and they were scattered all over the field.  In the Final Union attack the IX Corps suffered 2,222 killed and wounded dwarfing Cox’s casualties at Lower Bridge.  Among the killed was Major General Isaac P. Rodman, felled by a Confederate bullet in the outskirts of Sharpsburg.  After his long search for a means to cross the creek he had come within arm’s reach of victory.  Following thirteen hours of combat the battle drew to a close. Only sporadic firing continued throughout the evening.  The two great American armies had bludgeoned each other to a bloody standstill.  Total casualties for the day were 23,110 killed, wounded, or missing.  September 17^th, 1862 – America’s bloodiest single day – had come to an end.[170]

          The following day, September 18^th, the two armies warily watched each other, each essentially in their original positions.  Lee defiantly stood his ground, McClellan cautiously awaited developments.  That night Robert E. Lee took what was left of his battered army down the road through Sharpsburg and the Potomac beyond, withdrawing back into Virginia, leaving the battlefield, his dead, and about half of his wounded in the hands of his enemy. [171]

          Generally the battle is viewed as a draw although when one considers that McClellan met both of his objectives of driving the Confederates out of Maryland and defending Washington the battle can be considered, and was considered by Lincoln, to be a Union victory prompting him to issue his Emancipation Proclamation, thus changing the course of the war.[172]

          Throughout the course of the thirteen hour struggle unit commanders frequently found their abilities to control the flow of battle subjugated by the whims of the terrain.  Command and control as we know it today were rendered untenable in instance after instance.  Rodman, advancing in ignorance of the terrain was drawn further and further from the fighting.  The Georgians found, through luck rather than design, quarry pits which provided them with ready made rifle pits,  A.P. Hill’s division, by chance, encountered the 16^th Connecticut in a swale and shattered them, nearly rolling up Burnside’s line. The lack of reconnaissance done by either opponent lay both armies open, for good or for ill, to the vagaries of the terrain of the Antietam Creek valley.

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                  Postscript

                                                   The Battle of Boetler’s Ford

          No chronicle of the 1862 Maryland Campaign is complete without some discussion of the Battle of Shepherdstown on September 19^th and 20^th.  Variously called the Battle of Shepherdstown, the Battle of Packhorse Ford, or the Battle of Boetler’s Ford, the small but bloody fight on the Virginia cliffs bordering the Potomac River represents McClellan’s tepid pursuit of Lee as well as the final act of the Maryland Campaign.[173]

          Lee’s withdrawal back into Virginia was by no means a retreat - it was merely a retrograde movement by a general who had not yet given up on the idea of a northern invasion.  Lee planned to re-cross the Potomac at Williamsport, eleven miles northwest of Sharpsburg to resume the campaign.  A brief, bloody, and important clash at Shepherdstown would influence his plan.[174]

          Lee executed his withdrawal from Sharpsburg under the cover of darkness on the night of September 18.  On the morning of the 19^th Pleasonton advanced elements of his cavalry to scout for the Confederate rear and to harass or slow the withdrawing enemy.  The Federal horsemen did scoop up 167 Confederates as prisoners as well as a gun and a stand of colors.  They followed the path of discarded detritus that characterizes an army on the move to the banks of the Potomac.[175] 

          The terrain at Boetler’s ford is the most extreme of the campaign and would be the determining factor in the brisk fight that was to follow.  Boetler’s ford is located nearly a mile south of Shepherdstown.  Three parallel lines are formed at the ford.  The middle line running roughly east and west is the Potomac River, the line to its north, on the Maryland side, is the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, the line to its south, on the Virginia side, is a long high ridge with 100 foot cliffs fronting the river.  Bisecting the ridge was a deep and partially wooded ravine.  The river could be crossed at the ford and also over a plank and stone dam 500 hundred yards west of the ford.[176]

                   The Virginia side of the river was lightly defended with a Confederate rear guard of 600 men along with the 40 guns of Lee’s artillery reserve under Brig. Gen. John Pendleton.  Porter’s V Corps, in reserve all day on the 17^th was tasked, as the freshest of McClellan’s corps, to pursue Lee, and throw a reconnaissance in strength across the river to determine the location of the Rebel army.  Porter deployed infantry and sharpshooters behind the embankment of the dry canal to fire upon the Confederates on the far bank.  Federal guns on very high ground three quarters of a mile upstream maintained a steady and damaging fire against the Confederate positions.  The fatigued Confederates were ordered to conserve their dwindling ammunition and to open fire only if the crossings were threatened.  Under intense fire the Confederate line wavered and fewer of their guns were able to respond to the Federal batteries.[177]

          Near dark on September 19 the first units of the V Corps forded the river.  The 4^th Michigan and the 1^st U.S. Sharpshooters led the way and were the first to ford the Potomac near the large lime kilns and cement mill on the Virginia side of the River.  The Confederate defenders, much reduced in number after a day of incessant shelling withdrew from the banks and fell back beyond the ridge.  The infantry that had been tasked with protecting Lee’s artillery reserve was taking to their feet.  Pendleton was horrified at the developing situation, his guns were utterly vulnerable.  Pendleton hurriedly ordered his gunners to limber up and evacuate the guns.  In the confusion and haste four guns were left behind though the rest managed to get on the route of withdrawal and join Lee’s rear guard.  The Sharpshooters and Michiganders suffered very light casualties in the crossing and, driving the Confederates off, formed line of battle atop the ridge and awaited the dawn .[178]

          At dawn on the 20^th Sykes’ regulars were sent across the river, ascended the steep ravine and formed line of battle at the top of the ridge.  Following the regulars were seven additional regiments of infantry including the 118^th Pennsylvania - the so called “Corn Exchange” regiment - which had been in uniform for less than one month and had as yet experienced no combat. The Pennsylvanians ascended the steep ravine and formed to the left, the ravine now to their right rear.  It was in this position, with cliffs to their backs that they established their line.[179]

          Shortly upon forming line the regulars detected movement in the trees before them.  Although they could determine that they were Confederates what they did not know was that they were facing A.P. Hill’s entire division just arriving, dispatched by Lee to cover his withdrawal and stop the Federal incursion into Virginia until Lee could get his army to safety.  At the moment the two sides came into contact the Federals were outnumbered by four to one.[180]

          Around 9:00 a.m. firing erupted, the Federals though outnumbered managed to hold their own long enough to effect an orderly withdrawal, such was the battle-tested discipline of the regulars.  Similarly six of the volunteer regiments managed to withdraw down the ravine and re-cross the Potomac at the ford and over the dam.  The Corn Exchange Regiment was not so fortunate.[181]

          Many factors conspired against the men of the 118^th Pennsylvania that morning.  The first was the overwhelming odds that they, as rookies, were suddenly facing - nearly three thousand of Lee’s most battle-hardened troops.  Added to their inexperience in such a situation was that they were carrying defective rifles only half of which were capable of being fired.  Finally their position with backs against a sheer cliff and cut off from their only means of escape - the ravine- the Pennsylvanians were in the worst and most desperate situation imaginable.  The terrain was their undoing[182]

          Horrified, the men of the 118^th found themselves between an experienced enemy and the worst possible terrain. Under intense and accurate fire from front, left, and right the Pennsylvanian’s position became desperate.  Rifles misfiring and men falling, the line began to break and a chaos of panic and confusion erupted.  Many threw down their weapons and raised their hands in surrender, others struggled to doggedly fight on or find a path of retreat and some attempted to find escape by clambering down the cliff, many losing their lives in the fall.  Most of the men found their way to the riverbank only to be subjected by a savage fire coming from directly above and by Confederates positioned in the cement mill.  Casualties quickly mounted, both from Rebel fire but also from Union artillery fire falling short and into the huddled groups of Corn Exchangers.  Those who made it to the river bank then had to run the gauntlet of the river by the ford or over the dam, under fire all the way.  For the 118^th Pennsylvania it was a tragedy mirroring that of Ball’s Bluff, with bodies of Pennsylvanians littering the banks and floating off down the river.  737 men of the 118^th Pennsylvania crossed the Potomac into Virginia 468 came back.  Now veterans, their baptism of fire in a nightmarish terrain had been a horror.[183]

          By 11:00 a.m. the brief battle was over.  The terrain of the steep cliffs at Boetler’s Ford proved the undoing of an entire Federal regiment.  McClellan, his army exhausted, was content to see Lee leave Maryland.  Lee, realizing the condition of his army, gave up any idea of reentering Maryland as the ford at Williamsport, one last key terrain feature of the campaign, was by that time heavily guarded by Federals.  Lee turned his army southwest toward the Shenandoah Valley and two and a half more years of war.[184] 

          After seven days and four battles, over some of the most difficult terrain of the eastern theater of the war, the Maryland Campaign came to a close.  Washington DC had been protected, Harrisburg was safe, and Robert E. Lee’s first northern invasion ended in failure. [185]

 

 

                                                                       Conclusion

          As has been seen, Lee’s 1862 Maryland Campaign was one of extremes of terrain; from the fighting atop South Mountain, to the heights surrounding Harpers Ferry, to the bluff above Burnside Bridge, to the deadly cliffs at Boetler’s ford, the terrain was a determining factor in the success or failure of the opposing armies.

           Though the terrain nearly always favored Lee, his paucity of troops at both South Mountain and Antietam prevented him from prevailing.  What could have been a mountain stronghold at the three passes through the mountain simply couldn’t be held by so few Confederates against the three corps of Federals that were hurled against them.  At Antietam Lee was, for the most part, masterful in his use of terrain to the advantage of his army, but again he had too small and army to prevail against McClellan’s Army of the Potomac.  Only at Harpers Ferry and Shepherdstown where terrain, coupled with numbers of troops that far outstripped his opponents, were the divisions of Lee able to emerge with complete victory.

          Certainly terrain influences every battle but the terrain encountered by Lee, fighting for the first time in a mountainous region, was unique in the challenges and opportunities with which it presented both sides in the Campaign.  In particular the terrain of Antietam, unchanged today, provides visitors to Antietam National Battlefield with unique opportunities to see the terrain of the battlefield much as did the soldiers who fought there a century and a half earlier.

          This thesis provides the first comprehensive study of the terrain of the Maryland Campaign.  This narrative, when used in conjunction with the experience of walking the landscape of the battlefields, should bring to the visitor, scholar, or historian a fuller understanding of the events and outcomes of the campaign and an appreciation of the sacrifices of the men, Union and Confederate, who fought there.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

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Bolton, William J. The Civil War Journal of Colonel William J. Bolton.  Edited by Richard A. Sauers. Conshohocken, PA: 2000.

 

Bowen, Charles T. Dear Friends at Home: The Civil War Letters and Diaries of Sergeant Charles T. Bowen.  Edited by Edward L. Cassedy.  Baltimore: Butternut and Blue, 2001

 

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Coffin, Charles C. “Antietam Scenes.” In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam, 682 – 685.  New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956.

 

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Dawes, Rufus R. “On the Right at Antietam.” Sketches of War History: 1861 – 1865, ed. Robert Hunter, 252 – 263, Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1893.

 

Douglas, Henry Kyd.  I rode with Stonewall: The War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson’s Staff.  Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968.

 

Evans, W. M.  “A Night to be Remembered.”  Confederate Veteran, June 1929, 216 -217.

 

Heth, Henry. “The Battle of Antietam – Sharpsburg”, Confederate Veteran, December 1893, 357.

 

Jones, William J.  “Report of General J.E. B. Stuart of Cavalry Operations on First Maryland Campaign, from August 30^th to September 18^th, 1862.”  Southern Historical Society Papers vol III: 281 – 294.

 

Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincot Company, 1896.

 

James Longstreet. “The Invasion of Maryland.” In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam, 663 – 674.  New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956.

 

McClellan, George B. Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.  New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864.

 

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Thompson, David L.  “With Burnside at Antietam.” In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam, 660 – 662.  New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956.

 

Walker, John G.  “Sharpsburg.”  ” In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam, 675 – 681.  New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956.

 

Wistar, Isaac Jones.  The Autobiography of Isaac Jones Wistar: 1827 – 1905, Half a Century in War and Peace. New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1937.

 

Secondary Source Material

 

Alexander, Ted.  The Battle of Antietam: The Bloodiest Day.  Charleston: The History Press, 2011.

 

Allan, William.  Strategy of the Campaign of Sharpsburg or Antietam.  Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts.  Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company1989.

 

Richard C. Anderson, Jr. and Curt Johnson. Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam.  College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.

 

Armstrong, Marion V. Disaster in the West Woods: General Edwin V. Sumner and the II Corps at Antietam, Sharpsburg MD: Western Maryland Interpretive Association, 2002.

 

_____. Unfurl Those Colors!: McClellan, Sumner, & the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2008.

 

Ballard, Ted. Staff Ride Guide: Battle of Antietam.  Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005.

 

Bridges, David P.  Fighting with Jeb Stuart.  Arlington VA: Breathes Bridges Best Inc., 2006.

 

Bearss, Edwin C. Fields of Honor: Pivotal Battles of the Civil War.  Washington D.C.: National Geographic, 2001.

 

Commager, Henry Steele.  The Blue and the Gray.  New York: The Fairfax Press, 1982.

 

Conrad, Bryan and H.J. Eckenrode.  George B. McClellan: The Man Who Saved the Union. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1941.

 

Davis, Burke.  JEB Stuart: The Last Cavalier.  New York: Wings Books, 1992.

 

Davis, George B.  The Antietam Campaign. .  Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts.  Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company1989.

 

Ernst, Kathleen A. Too Afraid to Cry: Maryland Civilians in the Antietam Campaign. Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole, 1999.

 

Foote, Shelby The Civil War: A Narrative – Fort Sumter to Perryville . New York: Random House, 1986.

 

Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America’s Bloodiest Day.  New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978.

 

Freeman, Douglas Southall.  Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command Cedar Mountain to Chancellorsville. New York: Scribner, 1943.

 

Frye, Dennis E.  September Suspense: Lincoln’s Union in Peril.  Harpers Ferry WV: Antietam Rest Publishing, 2012.

 

Fuller, John D.  Battlefield Terrain Study: Burnside’s Attack Against the Confederate Right at Antietam.  Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1985.

 

Goodwin, Doris Kearns Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005.

 

Gordon, Lesley J. “All Who Went into That Battle Were Heroes.” In The Antietam Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher, 169 – 191. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 

 

Gottfried, Bradley M.  The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie LLC, 2012.

 

Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862 . Kent OH: The Kent State University Press, 2000.

 

_____.  Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862.  Kent OH: The Kent State University Press, 1999.

 

Hartwig, D. Scott To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.

 

Hassler, Warren W.  General George B. McClellan: Shield of the Union. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957.

 

Herdegen, Lance J.  The Iron Brigade in Civil War and Memory.  El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie LLC, 2012.

 

Hipp, Scott F.  Old Line Divided: Maryland in the Civil War.  Baltimore: The Baltimore Bookworks LLC, 2011.

 

Hoptak, John David The Battle of South Mountain. Charleston: The History Press, 2011.

 

Jamieson, Perry D.  Death in September: The Antietam Campaign.  Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, McMurry University, 1999.

 

Jermann, Donald R.  Antietam: The Lost Order. Donald R. German, 2006.

 

Krick, Robert E. L. “Defending Lee’s Flank: J.E.B. Stuart, John Pelham, and Confederate Artillery on Nicodemus Heights.” In The Antietam Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher, 192 – 222. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

 

_____. “It Appeared As Though Mutual Extermination Would Put a Stop to the Awful Carnage: Confederates in Sharpsburg’s Bloody Lane.” In The Antietam Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher, 223 – 258. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

 

Luvass, Jay and Harold W. Nelson, Guide to the Battle of Antietam.  University Press of Kansas, 1987.

 

Marvel, William. Burnisde.  Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

 

McGrath, Thomas A. Shepherdstown: Last Clash of the Antietam Campaign September 19 – 20. Lynchburg: Schroeder Publications, 2007.

 

McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam - The Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

 

Mingus, Scott L.  Human Interest Stories from Antietam.  Orrtanna, PA: Colecraft, 2007.

 

Mitchell, Charles W.  Maryland Voices of the Civil War.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.

 

Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’ Maryland Campaign.  Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.

 

Murfin, James V. and Stephen W. Sears.  History and Tour Guide of the Antietam Battlefield.  Columbus: Blue and Gray Enterprises, Inc, 1995.

 

Nolan, Alan T.  The Iron Brigade: A Military History.  Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994.

 

Priest, John Michael.  Antietam: The Soldier’s Battle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

 

Rafuse, Ethan S. McClellan’s War.  Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005.

 

Robertson, James L.  Stonewall Jackson: The Man the Soldier, the Legend. New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1997.

 

Schildt, John W.  Maryland at Antietam.  Sharpsburg, MD: John W. Shildt, 2012.

 

Sears, Stephen W.  George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon.  New York: Da Capo Press, 1999.

 

_____. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan.  New York: Da Capo Press, 1989.

 

_____. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam.  Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983.

 

Tilberg, Frederick.  Antietam.  Washington DC: National Park Service, 1961.

 

Tucker, Phillip Thomas.  Burnside’s Bridge: The Climactic Struggle of the 2^nd and 20^th Georgia at Antietam Creek.  Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2000.

 

Wert, Jeffry D.  Cavalryman of the Lost Cause: A Biography of J.E.B. Stuart.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.

 

_____.  General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

---

[1] Stephen Vincent Benet, John Brown’s Body (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1990), 82.

 

[2] Official Record of the War of the Rebellion: Series I volume 19 part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887).

[3] Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of 1862, ed. Thomas G. Clemens (El Dorado Hills CA: Savas Beatie), 2012.

[4] In the 1880 a series of 13 books chronicling various battles of the Civil War and written by leading participants of those battles was published by Charles Scribner’s and Sons.  The series is generally considered part of the Civil War canon among scholars and historians.  Similarly Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, with accounts again penned by battle participants and published in the 1890s is a seminal resource for first-hand accounts of the war.

[5] Francis W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996).

[6] Jacob D. Cox, Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Volume 1 – April1861 – November 1863 (Cincinnati: William C. Cochran, 1900)

[7] George B. McClellan, General McClellan’s Report and Campaigns (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864).

[8] James W. Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincot Company, 1896

[9] Alexander, E.P. Military Memoirs of the Confederacy New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907.

[10] Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983).

[11] James V. Murfin, The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign September 1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).

[12] Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, September 2 – 20, 1862 (El Dorado Hills, CA: 2012).

[13] Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862.  (Kent OH: The Kent State University Press, 1999).

[14]  James M. McPherson,  Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam The Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

 

[16] John D. Fuller, Battlefield Terrain Study: Burnside’s Attack Against the Confederate Right at Antietam (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1985).

[17] The Valley today is much the same as it was at the time of the war.  Small towns such as Lexington, Winchester, Staunton, Roanoke and others are generally known as small college towns rather than economic or communication hubs, certainly there are exceptions but with the fortunes of most valley towns declined with the end of railroading in the area.  Ironically one of the greatest industries of the Valley is based upon a period of great privation and hardship in the Valley – Civil War tourism.  Between colleges and tourism many valley towns flourish within their means today.

[18] Early’s foray north was an attempt to take pressure off of the beleaguered Confederates besieged at Petersburg and precipitated the Battle of Monocacy outside of Frederick Maryland on July 20, 1864; the so-called “Battle that Saved Washington.”

[19] Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood (Kent Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1999), 60.

[20] McPherson, 88-89.

[21] Harsh, 57.

[22] McPherson, 97.

[23] Ibid., 93.

[24] Correspondence from Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck to George B. McClellan, Official Record of the War of the Rebellion: Series I Vol. 19 part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887), 280-281.

[25] Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 479.

[26] Stephen W. Sears, The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (Cambridge MA: Da Capo Press, 1989), 435.

[27] Murfin, 96.

[28]Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), 605.

[29] Official Record: Series I volume 19 part II, 184-185.

[30] Report of Maj. Albert J. Myer, Official Record: Series volume 19 part 118.

[31] Ernst, Kathleen, A.  Too Afraid to Cry: Maryland Civilians in the Maryland Campaign (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 39.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Harsh, 151.

[34] Ethan S. Rafuse, Antietam, South Mountain, and Harpers Ferry: A Battlefield Guide (Lincoln NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 216.

[35] Harsh, 98-99.

[36] Donald R. Jermann, Antietam: The Lost Order (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, 2006), 125.

[37] David T. Gilbert, A Walker’s Guide to Harpers Ferry (Harpers Ferry WV: Harpers Ferry Historical Association, 2006), 17.

[38] Harsh, 77.

[39] Longstreet, 202.

[40] Report of Lt. Henry M. Binney, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 534.

[41] Stephen W. Sears, The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (Cambridge MA: Da Capo Press, 1989), 453.

[42] McClellan is justifiably criticized, but too often pilloried, by many historians for his chronic overestimation of the forces arrayed against him.  Perhaps it would be fruitful for this discussion to consider that McClellan was frequently operating beyond the lines of the telegraph and had no instantaneous communications available to him.  Also there was no staff position dedicated to intelligence collection and analysis – the G2 position of the 20th century army.  Both of these assets are taken for granted today and have been since before the Second World War.  When these limitations are factored in to the history perhaps a more measured view of McClellan can emerge , if only on this issue alone.

[43] Correspondence from Andrew Curtin to Abraham Lincoln, Official Record of the War of the Rebellion: series I volume 19, part II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887) 277.

[44] Ibid., 193.

[45] Stephen W. Sears, Landscape 105.

[46] Harsh, 212.

[47] Ibid., 178.

[48] John David Hoptak, The Battle of South Mountain (Charleston SC: The History Press, 2011), 133.

[49] Report of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Powell Hill, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 980.

[50] Harsh, Taken at the Flood, 288.

[51] Stephen W. Sears, The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, 459.

[52] Joseph L. Harsh, Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2000), 17.

[53] Report of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 855 - 856.

[54] Report of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 375.

[55] Report of Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 981.

[56] Donald R. Jermann, Antietam: The Lost Order (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing Company, 2006), 146-147.

[57] Testimony of Colonel Daniel Cameron, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 631

[58] Verdict of the Harpers Ferry Military Commission, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 799.

[59] Longstreet, 233-234.

[60] Carman, 1.

[61]New York Herald, 19 September 1862.  http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030213/1862-09-19/ed-i/seq-1/

[62] America's Volcanic Past: Appalachians Mountains and Scenic Trail, Blue Ridge Mountains and National Parkway, Great Smoky Mountains and National Park, Shenandoah National Park.  http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/LivingWith/VolcanicPast/Places/volcanic_past_appalachians.html

[63] Report of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 817.

[64] Report of Gen. Robert E. Lee, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 140.

[65] Carol Reardon, “From Antietam to the Argonne,” in  The Antietam Campaign, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 296.

[66] Report of Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 830.

[67] Longstreet, 235, 236.

[68] Jay Luvaas and Harold Nelson, A Guide to the Battle of Antietam: The Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1987), 117.

[69] E.P. Alexander Military Memoirs of the Confederacy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907), 241-248.  In his memoir Alexander is very critical of the position Lee chose stating “Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of the field, there was one feature of it which should have been conclusive against giving battle there.  That feature was the Potomac River.  We were backed up against it. Within two miles, and there was no bridge and but a single ford accessible and a bad one rocky and deep.”

[70] Harsh, 361.

[71] Report of Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 217.

[72] Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders, 667.

[73] Col.David Strouther, The Blue and the Gray, ed. Henry Steele Commager (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1982), 208.

[74] Maj. Gen. Report of J.E.B. Stuart, Official Record, volume 19 part 1, 819.

[75] Report Maj. Gen. of Ambrose Burnside, Official Record, volume 19 part 1, 418.

[76] Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864), 374.

[77] Stephen Sears, Landscape, 177.

[78] Report of Brig. Gen. George G. Meade, Official Record, volume 19, part I, 270.

[79] Palfrey, 82.

[80] Report of Maj. Gen. J.E.B Stuart, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 819.

[81] Report of Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 218.

[82] Ibid., 212.

[83] Emmor Cope, Antietam Battlefield Board, map 1 (United States War Department, 1904).

[84] Ibid.

[85] Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox Military Reminiscences of the Civil War: Volume 1 – April 1861 – November 1863 (Cincinnati: William C. Cochran, 1900), 192.

[86] Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson Jr. Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 47.

[87] Carman, 105.

[88] Report of John Brig. Gen. Gibbon, Official Record, volume 19, part I, 248 – 249.

[89] Cope, Antietam Battlefield Board, map 1

[90] Palfrey, 78.

[91] Report of Brig. Gen. George Sears Greene, Official Record, , volume 19, part I, 505.

[92] Harsh, 376-377.

[93] Murfin, 221.

[94] Armstrong, 178.

[95] Ibid., 387.

[96] Palfrey, 83-84.

[97] Harsh, 387.

[98] If one stands today at what would have been Sumner’s vantage point the Mumma swale - the position of Greene – is entirely visible.  As in most instances at Antietam the field is so well preserved that the view sheds of the participants are generally still available today.

[99] Harsh, 387.

[100] Marion V. Armstrong, Unfurl Those Colors!:McClellan, Sumner, and the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2008) 188.

[101] Sumner’s performance at Antietam has been the subject of much conjecture and controversy over the past century and a half.  Palfrey is utterly critical of Sumner characterizing the nature of his advance to the West Woods thus; “The attempt was madness.”  That Palfrey was seriously wounded in Sumner’s advance and subsequent debacle may somewhat color his opinion. Similarly much discussion focuses on just how Sumner could have allowed French to have become so separated from the rest of the II Corps and what role Sumner’s leadership played in that maneuver; was it by accident or design that he failed to positively deploy French in the West Woods fight in a manner in which he could have made the crucial difference? In this instance Palfrey asks and answers the question; “Why French was so far from Sedgwick is not explained.” Carman, and very recently Armstrong cite a letter by Samuel Sumner, the general’s son and aide, who states Sumner gave French “positive orders” to take the position he did, making the case that Sumner was indeed the master of the situation and had the tactical situation in his grasp.  Stephen Sears brings a moderating voice to the controversy simply stating that Sumner’s was “a plan based entirely upon misapprehension.” French, in his official report is clear that he thought he was forming on Sedgwick’s left, though as it happened he was an eighth of a mile beyond that position and heading in another direction entirely. Sumner in his report states that Sedgwick’s division was “followed by French’s division in the same order.  Richardson was ordered to move in the same direction about and hour later.”  Sumner however is mute regarding how events eventually unfolded.  Sumner died in 1863 and left no elaborating account of his actions at Antietam.

[102] Cox, 196.

[103] Carman, 308.

[104] Armstrong, 209.

[105] Report of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, Official Record, volume. 19, part 1, 327.

[106] Harsh, 395.

[107] McPherson, 128.

[108] Carman, 248.

[109] Sears, 239.

[110] Murfin, 250.

[111] ibid

[112] Sears, 238.

[113] Report of Maj. Gen. William H. French, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 324.

[114] Harsh, 397.

[115] Palfrey, 100.

[116] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative – Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Random House, 1986), 693.

[117] Report of Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 1025

[118] Murfin, 267.

[119] Report of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 418

[120] Ibid.

[121] It is noteworthy that in his September 30, 1862 after-action report, Burnside still heads his report: “Headquarters Right Wing, Army of the Potomac.”  Burnside clung to the idea that he was still in command of more than just the IX Corps nearly two weeks after the battle.

[122] Report of George B. McClellan, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 30.

[123] In his Report of the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, published in 1864, McClellan presents a variant version of his plan in which the differences are subtle but telling: “My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy’s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield. Supported by Sumner’s, and if necessary, Franklin’s, and as soon as matters looked favorably there to move the corps of Gen. Burnside against the enemy’s extreme right...and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful to advance our center with all their forces then disposable.”  Absent in the later version is any mention of Burnside’s actions to be nothing more than a diversion but instead a general flank attack equal to the action on the army’s right under Sumner et. al. McClellan’s 1864 version of events presented a version of his plan which subtly but directly placed blame for the indecisive end of the battle squarely upon the shoulders of Burnside.  Jacob Cox, in his memoir, pointedly notes that McClellan’s later version may very well have been in the service of his run for the presidency.

[124] Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode with Stonewall: The War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson’s Staff (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940), 172.

[125] Report of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 888.

[126] Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside’s Bridge: The Climactic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000), 52.

[127] Cox, 207.

[128] Carman, 407.

[129] Cox, 208.

[130] Ibid.

[131] This “micro-management may have exacerbated the already wounded ego of Burnside and further hardened his feelings toward his chief. That such fast friends as Burnside and McClellan became so alienated from one another speaks to the political intrigues that plagued the Army of the Potomac for much of its existence.

[132] Cox, 206.

[133] Tucker, 74.

[134] Cox, 208-209

[135] Carman, 398.

[136] Tucker, 81.

[137] Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 31.

[138] Carman, 411.

[139] Tucker, 91.

[140] Carman, 425.

[141] Carman,  412.

[142] Report of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 890.

[143] Carman, 415 -416.

[144] Ibid., 416.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Carman, 426.

[147] Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 444.

[148] Ibid

[149] Gottfried, 212.

[150] Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis, Official Report, volume 19, part 1, 444.

[151]

[152] Carman, 356.

[153] McClellan, 387.

[154] Gottfried, 215.

[155] Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 212.

[156] Cox, 210.  Cox was a supporter of Burnside and was vocal in defense of his general in the years following the war when an onus had been placed upon Burnside for the indecisive outcome of the battle.  Cox was far from a lap dog however and examined the issue in a cool, measured, and convincing manner.  Although not a professional soldier, Cox was among a very small fraternity (including Logan and Schurz) of “political generals” who competently acquitted themselves in a manner which caused them to be held in very high esteem by the professionals.

[157] Murfin, 278.

[158] Carman, 434.

[159] Report of Brig. Gen. Orlando Willcox, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 430.

[160] Carman, 446.

[161] Ibid., 447.

[162] McClellan, 392.

[163] Report of Lt. Col. Joseph B. Curtis, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 456.

[164] Palfrey, 113.

[165] Ibid.

[166] Gottfried, 232.

[167] Cox, 212.

[168] Sears, 288.

[169] Carman, 487.

[170] Palfrey, 114.

[171] Report of Robert E. Lee, Official Record, vol. 19, part 1, 142.

[172] Meager though that victory was it was enough of a victory to enable Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.  Although the proclamation would only lead to the eventual end of slavery, what it did immediately was to put Britain on notice; this had become a war of Liberation.  Britain had abolished slavery thirty years earlier and now they could not in good conscience recognize or support a slave nation, France would quickly follow suit.  Without that foreign intervention the Confederacy was doomed.  It would take another two and a half years of killing before it was over, indeed there would be Confederate successes following Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville among them but for the hopes and aspirations of an independent Confederacy, from the banks of Antietam Creek it was pretty much all downhill for the South.  Although Gettysburg is often viewed as the turning point of the Civil War, it is the contention of this writer that Antietam and Vicksburg were in fact the crucial events of the war.

[173] Thomas A. McGrath, Shepherdstown: Last Clash of the Antietam Campaign September 19 – 20, 1862 (Lynchburg: Schroeder Publications, 2007), xv.

[174] Report of Gen. Robert E. Lee, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 142 – 143.

[175] Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 212.

[176] Generally when one thinks of the border between Maryland and Virginia (now West Virginia) at Shepherdstown one naturally visualizes an east to west alignment, however Boetler’s ford is a great bend in the Potomac, giving it a north to south configuration.

[177] Gottfried, 238.

[178] Ibid.,240

[179] Report of Brig. Gen. George Sykes, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 351.

[180] McGrath, 97.

[181] Report of Brig. Gen. George Sykes, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 352.

[182] Report of Lt. Col. James Gwyn, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 348.

[183] McGrath, 183.

[184] Report of Gen. Robert E. Lee, Official Record, volume 19, part 1, 152.

[185] Hikers of the area of the Boetler’s Ford battle today are greeted by a terrain little changed from the time of that fight.  The remains of the multi-story cement mill are still there as are the lime kilns, the arches of which men of the 118^th PA sheltered in.  To hike up the steep ravine the plight of the 118^th becomes immediately apparent as their escape route is, for the most part, blocked by a cliff, or at least a very steep bluff.  It also becomes clear that the Confederates, once driving the 118^th from the ridge were afforded by the terrain perfect position to fire down into the huddled Pennsylvanians on the riverbanks as well as those Federals fording the river.

           Nearly all of the land that comprises the battlefield is intact and undeveloped, however it is, for the most part, private property and under threat of development.  An effort to purchase and preserve the core battle area has been undertaken by the Civil War Trust, the Shepherdstown Battlefield Preservation Association, and the Battlefield Protection Program of the National Park Service.  At the time of this writing 75 acres of the core battlefield including the kilns and mill have been preserved.  Currently the National Park Service is reviewing alternatives developed by a Special Resource Study as a part of an initiative by the late Senator Byrd of West Virginia to include the Shepherdstown battlefield as a unit of the National Park Service.  The Park Service anticipates a public meeting before March 2014 that will detail alternatives and solicit public involvement.  Approximately two months after that the NPS will submit its recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior.  As currently imagined the proposed site would be a unit of Antietam National Battlefield with the significance of being the final battle of the Maryland Campaign and the largest battle fought in what is now West Virginia.